W$t  Htbrarp 

ofttje 

fimtoersittp  ofj^ortti  Carolina 


CoIIettion  of  Jlortf)  Carolmiatta 

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THE  BATTLE  OF  KINGS  MOUNTAIN 
AND  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  COWPENS 


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70th  Congress,  1st  Session      »      «      •      House  Document  No.  328 


HISTORICAL  STATEMENTS 


CONCERNING 


THE  BATTLE  OF  KINGS  MOUNTAIN 


AND 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  COWPENS 


SOUTH  CAROLINA 


UNITED  STATES 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

WASHINGTON 

1928 


HOUSE  RESOLUTION  No.  230 
Presented  by  Mr.  Stevenson 

Resolved,  That  the  historical  statements  concerning  the  Battle  of  the  Cowpens, 
South  Carolina,  of  January  17,  1781,  and  the  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain,  South 
Carolina,  October  7, 1780,  both  prepared  by  the  Historical  Section  of  the  Army 
War  College,  be  printed,  with  illustrations,  as  a  document. 

William  Tyler  Page, 
CUr\. 


1  =  1 


LETTER  OF  TRANSMITTAL 

War  Department, 
Washington,  April  21, 1928. 
Hon.  William  F.  Stevenson, 

House  of  Representatives. 
Dear  Mr.  Stevenson:  In  compliance  with  the  request  contained  in  your  letter 
of  March  20, 1928, 1  am  pleased  to  inclose  herewith  a  historical  statement  con- 
cerning the  Battle  of  the  Cowpens,  South  Carolina,  of  January  17, 1781,  prepared 
by  the  Historical  Section  of  the  Army  War  College. 

Very  sincerely, 

Dwight  L.  Davis, 

Secretary  of  War. 


I  nil 


THE  BATTLE  OF  KINGS  MOUNTAIN 
SOUTH  CAROLINA 

October  7,  1780 


THE  BATTLE  OF  KINGS  MOUNTAIN 


Part  I 


THE  SUBJUGATION  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA 

!  HE  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain,  South  Carolina, 
occurred  on  the  7th  day  of  October,  1780,  and 

T£$£4  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  Lieutenant  Colonel 
^Y2  Ferguson,  who  commanded  the  royal  forces, 
2#l?(  and  the  loss  of  his  command,  not  one  man 
escaping  from  the  battle  field.  The  thorough' 
ness  of  the  disaster,  and  the  death  of  the 
brave  and  highly  trusted  leader,  was  by  far  the  most  serious  blow 
to  which  the  British  forces  operating  in  the  Southern  Provinces 
had  been  subjected.  The  immediate  effect  upon  Cornwallis  was 
to  put  an  end,  for  the  time  being,  to  the  further  subjugation 
of  the  Province  of  North  Carolina.  His  contemplated  advance 
from  Charlotte  Town  to  Salisbury  was  menaced  by  a  new  and 
unheard  of  enemy — the  men  under  Campbell,  Shelby,  Sevier,  and 
others — who  came  from  the  region  of  the  mountains,  and  the  back' 
waters  that  flow  to  the  west;  from  places  so  remote  and  unknown 
to  the  British  leaders  as  to  be  almost  mythical.  This  avenging 
horde  made  necessary  a  hasty  revision  of  Cornwallis's  plans  follow' 
ing  Kings  Mountain,  which  resulted  in  his  immediate  withdrawal 
to  the  South,  and  the  concentration  of  his  main  army,  detached 
posts,  and  flanking  parties,  into  positions  capable  of  rendering 
mutual  assistance. 

These  hardy  men  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  Alleghenies,  of  deep 
religious  convictions,  were  accustomed  to  the  hardships  and  inde' 
pendence  of  a  pioneer  life,  and  in  their  mountain  homes  in  the 
highlands  and  the  backwaters  they  but  seldom  were  concerned 

111 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUNTAIN 

with  affairs  beyond  their  borders  or  interfered  with  by  Crown  or 
colony.  When  Ferguson  approached  their  kingdom  and  threatened 
to  invade  their  lands  and  lay  waste  their  country  with  "fire  and 
sword,"  and  to  "hang  their  leaders,"  he  aroused  their  indignation 
and  anger  to  such  a  degree  that  they  determined  to  rid  the  country 
forever  of  this  enemy,  who  menaced  their  independence  and  the 
safety  of  their  homes  and  families.  Had  Cornwallis  and  his  leaders 
known  more  about  these  mountain  and  backwater  men,  they  would 
have  carefully  avoided  all  military  and  punitive  measures  which 
might  tend  to  draw  them  from  their  mountain  fastnesses  to  enroll 
amongst  the  enemies  of  the  King. 

The  causes  of  the  Revolution  were  but  little  known  to  many 
of  these  pioneers  beyond  the  Blue  Ridge.  They  were  concerned  in 
the  establishment  of  their  homes,  breaking  the  soil  of  their  new 
settlements,  and  wringing  a  livelihood  from  it;  and  with  their  rifles 
securing  much  of  their  sustenance.  They  sought  the  seclusion  of 
the  western  waters;  and  in  the  valleys  of  the  Holston,  the  Watauga, 
and  the  Nolichucky,  found  freedom  in  the  exercise  of  their  reli' 
gion.  Had  the  western  covering  force  of  Cornwallis's  army,  as  it 
advanced  into  the  Province  of  North  Carolina,  confined  its  activ' 
ities  to  the  plains  and  lowlands  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  had  not 
Ferguson  from  Gilbert  Town  uttered  his  threat  of  fire  and  sword 
and  the  hangman's  noose,  these  mountain  men  would  probably 
have  remained  in  their  homes,  and  but  few  of  them  would  have 
joined  with  those  who  were  in  rebellion  against  the  King. 

The  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain  was  fought  by  men  on  both  sides 
whose  bravery  should  be  a  matter  of  pride  to  all  posterity.  The 
troops  commanded  by  Ferguson  were  Americans,  or  persons  who 
had  come  to  the  Provinces  prior  to  the  Revolution.  His  command 
consisted  of  about  125  picked  officers  and  men,  taken  from  several 
regular  battalions  raised  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey,  and  formed 
into  a  temporary  Provincial  Corps.  These  men  were  Loyalists,  and 
they  gave  their  services  to  the  Crown  with  the  same  high  sense  of 
duty  which  prompted  their  brothers  and  neighbors  to  rebel  against 

[21 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUNTAIN 

further  domination  by  Great  Britain.  Supplementing  the  Provin' 
cial  Corps  was  a  greater  number  of  Tory  militia,  enrolled  in  the 
Carolinas.  Their  services  were  offered  for  a  variety  of  reasons; 
some  because  of  their  belief  that  the  government  of  the  mother 
country  should  continue,  others  because  of  expediency  so  that  their 
lands  and  possessions  might  be  given  the  protection  of  the  British 
flag,  still  others  served  as  soldiers  of  fortune  under  the  flag  which 
they  believed  would  be  successful,  and  a  small  number  were  influ' 
enced  by  a  base  desire  to  rob  and  plunder  under  the  license  usually 
associated  with  partisan  warfare. 

Under  the  confederated  leaders,  who  commanded  at  Kings 
Mountain,  were  a  few  refugees  from  the  lowlands,  some  small 
groups  from  the  counties  east  of  the  mountains,  and  a  large  number 
of  mountain  and  backwater  men  whose  independence  was  being 
threatened  by  an  alien  invader.  In  answering  the  call  to  embody 
under  their  local  leaders,  there  existed  the  definite  understanding 
among  these  mountain  men  that  they  were  going  into  the  lowlands 
to  fight,  and  that  they  would  not  return  to  their  homes  until  they, 
or  Ferguson,  had  been  defeated. 

At  Kings  Mountain  the  defenders  used  the  bayonet  and  the  rifle 
until  their  losses  made  surrender  of  the  survivors  inevitable.  The 
attackers  faced  bullet  and  bayonet,  and  responded  with  an  expert 
use  of  the  rifle,  with  which  they  were  familiar,  due  to  their  fre' 
quent  stalking  of  game  and  Indians.  The  mountain  men  were  not 
accustomed  to  the  bayonet,  but  they  were  expert  in  taking  cover 
behind  rocks  and  trees.  Ferguson  was  confident  that  his  position 
rendered  him  secure  against  any  untrained  and  unorganized  horde 
which  might  attack  him.  His  Provincial  Corps  were  trained  in  the 
use  of  the  bayonet  and  were  commanded  by  competent  leaders. 
The  militia  had  received  some  limited  training  in  the  art  of  war, 
and  were  provided  with  long  hunting  knives  to  be  attached  to  their 
rifles,  in  lieu  of  the  bayonet.  Their  marksmanship  was  not  as  effec 
tive  as  was  that  of  the  mountain  men,  as  conditions  of  life  in  the 
lowlands  were  not  such  as  to  make  their  daily  existence  dependent 

131 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

upon  accurate  use  of  the  rifle.  Ferguson  was  a  trained  soldier,  an 
able  leader,  and,  together  with  Tarleton,  one  of  Cornwallis''s  most 
valuable  lieutenants. 

In  both  the  Carolinas  there  was  a  large  number  of  citizens, 
and  probably  a  majority,  whose  sympathies  at  one  time  or  another 
in  1780  were  with  the  Royal  Government.  They  believed  that  a 
rebellion  could  not,  and  should  not,  succeed.  In  commenting  on  the 
internecine  warfare  carried  on  without  cessation,  General  Greene 
wrote  on  the  23d  of  May,  1781,  more  than  five  months  after  he  had 
assumed  command  of  the  Southern  Department: 

The  animosity  between  the  Whigs  and  Tories  of  this  State  renders  their 
situation  truly  deplorable.  There  is  not  a  day  passes  but  there  are  more  or  less 
who  fall  a  sacrifice  to  this  savage  disposition.  The  Whigs  seem  determined  to 
extirpate  the  Tories  and  the  Tories  the  Whigs.  Some  thousands  have  fallen  in 
this  way  in  this  quarter,  and  the  evil  rages  with  more  violence  than  ever.  If  a 
slop  can  not  be  put  to  these  massacres,  the  country  will  be  depopulated  in  a  few 
months  more,  as  neither  Whig  nor  Tory  can  live. 

The  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain  was  not  an  isolated  action;  it  was 
the  high  spot  of  1780  in  the  South.  The  surrender  of  Charleston, 
the  defeat  of  the  American  forces  at  Camden  on  the  16th  of  August, 
of  Sumter  two  days  later,  the  many  engagements  of  lesser  impor' 
tance,  all  added  prestige  to  the  royal  cause,  resulting  in  the  com' 
plete  subjugation  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina.  Cornwallis  had 
advanced  as  far  as  Charlotte  Town  in  North  Carolina  and  was 
preparing  to  move  his  headquarters  to  Salisbury,  when  the  unex' 
peeled  blow  delivered  by  the  mountain  men  at  Kings  Mountain 
brought  to  an  immediate  end  the  thought  of  further  conquest  and 
made  necessary  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  forces  into  South 
Carolina  and  the  assumption  of  a  defensive  role  for  several  months 
thereafter.  Therefore,  to  have  an  intelligent  understanding  of  the 
Battle  of  Kings  Mountain  and  its  effect  upon  the  southern  cam' 
paign  of  1780,  it  is  necessary  to  know  something  of  the  movements 
of  the  King's  forces  from  the  time  Charleston  was  invested. 

The  British  land  forces  in  America  were  commanded  by  Sir 
Henry  Clinton,  whose  official  title  was  "General  and  commander 
in  chief  of  His  Majesty's  forces  in  the  several  Provinces  in  America 

141 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

on  the  Atlantic,  from  Nova  Scotia  to  west  Florida,  inclusive." 
Vice  Admiral  Mariot  Arbuthnot  commanded  the  fleet,  and  Lord 
Cornwallis,  who  had  been  designated  by  Whitehall  as  second  in 
command  to  Clinton,  held  a  dormant  commission  giving  him  the 
rank  of  general  in  America,  only,  should  an  unforeseen  accident 
happen  to  the  commander  in  chief. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1779  the  Americans  made  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  recover  Savannah  from  the  British,  and  following  this 
failure  the  French  fleet,  which  supported  the  move,  departed  for 
the  West  Indies.  Clinton  and  Arbuthnot  now  considered  the  time 
propitious  to  make  another  attempt  against  Charleston,  with  the 
idea  of  occupying  the  Carolinas,  giving  support  to  the  Tories  and 
popularising  the  Crown  cause.  Furthermore,  such  a  move  would 
result  in  curtailing  colony  traffic  with  Europe  by  way  of  the 
Chesapeake. 

Upon  completion  of  their  plans,  the  amphibious  expedition 
under  Clinton  and  Arbuthnot  sailed  from  its  base,  New  York, 
December  26, 1779.  Charleston  Harbor  was  occupied,  siege  laid  to 
the  city,  and  on  the  12th  of  May  General  Lincoln  surrendered  the 
town  and  its  garrison. 

Upon  the  capitulation  of  Charleston,  Clinton  considered  that 
the  major  effort  in  the  subjugation  of  the  Province  had  been  accom- 
plished,  and  that,  with  this  showing  of  the  power  of  the  Crown, 
most  of  the  inhabitants  would  join  the  loyal  cause.  It  would  be 
necessary,  of  course,  to  occupy  the  country  with  a  considerable 
land  force,  and  thereby  give  protection  to  loyal  sympathizers,  but 
it  was  thought  that  the  British  regular  force  under  his  command 
would  be  largely  augmented  by  Tory  militia,  who  would  aid  in 
keeping  the  revolutionists  suppressed. 

Cornwallis  commanded  in  the  field,  and  on  May  17  had  a  force 
of  regulars  to  the  number  of  2,542  rank  and  file,  which  Clinton 
believed  would  be  sufficient,  when  augmented  by  militia,  to  sub' 
jugate  South  Carolina  and  continue  the  campaign  into  North  Care 
lina.  At  the  same  time  Cornwallis  was  advised  that  in  view  of  the 

151 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUHTAIH 

importance  of  his  mission,  troops  were  not  to  be  sainted,  and  he 
was  offered,  by  Clinton,  any  that  he  might  desire  from  the  garrisons 
of  the  several  forts.  For  the  initiation  of  the  campaign,  his  army 
was  to  be  augmented  by  the  light  infantry  and  the  Fortysecond 
Regiment,  with  the  understanding  that  they  were  to  be  returned 
to  Clinton  as  soon  as  they  could  be  spared,  as  his  contemplated 
operations  to  the  northward  would  be  cramped  without  them. 
Corn  walks  was  of  the  belief  that  he  had  sufficient  regular  forces  to 
eventually  control  all  the  territory  from  the  Floridas  to  Virginia, 
and  on  the  18th  of  May  wrote  Clinton  that  he  would  regret  to  see 
left  behind  any  part  of  the  troops  destined  for  use  elsewhere,  and 
unless  considerable  reinforcements  of  Continentals  should  come 
from  the  northward  to  join  the  revolutionists,  he  would  not  need 
more  assistance.  He  suggested  that  the  publication  of  intelligence 
by  Clinton  that  he  and  Arbuthnot  were  moving  to  the  Chesa' 
peake  would  probably  stop  off,  on  those  waters,  any  reinforcements 
intended  for  the  Carolinas.  In  case  Clinton  learned  before  sailing 
to  the  north  that  enemy  reinforcements  were  well  on  their  way, 
Corn  walks  asked  that  his  command  be  increased  by  some  five  or  six 
hundred  British  or  Hessians.  It  will  be  noted  later  that  at  this  time 
Washington  and  Congress  were  preparing  Maryland  and  Debt' 
ware  troops,  under  De  Kalb,  to  march  to  the  South,  and  that,  by 
resolution  of  Congress,  these  two  States  were  transferred  to  the 
Southern  Department. 

On  May  20  the  kght  infantry  and  the  Fortysecond  Regiment, 
promised  to  CornwalKs  to  supplement  his  forces  temporarily, 
marched  to  Monks  Corner  and  reported.  At  this  time  both  the 
commander  in  chief  and  Corn  walks  were  hopeful  that  South  Caro' 
lina  would  offer  but  kttle  resistance  to  complete  subjugation, 
although  there  was,  in  Clinton's  mind,  a  measure  of  doubt,  for  he 
knew  that  the  entire  success  of  the  campaign  would  depend  upon 
whether  or  not  "the  temper  of  our  friends  in  those  districts  is  such 
as  it  has  always  been  represented  to  us." 

The  time  arrived  when  Clinton  and  the  fleet  could  no  longer 
delay  departure  for  the  north.  La  Fayette  had  returned  to  America 

161 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    M0UH7AIH 

on  April  27,  with  the  promise  of  his  Government  that  a  French 
fleet  and  army  would  follow  him  in  a  short  time.  Information  of 
this  early  augmentation  of  the  enemy  forces  reached  Arbuthnot 
and  Clinton,  and  they  deemed  it  advisable  to  assemble  the  fleet  and 
troops  at  New  York,  and  for  the  time  being  make  no  move  against 
the  Chesapeake.  Cornwallis  was  instructed  that  after  he  had  fin' 
ished  his  southern  campaign  of  subjugation,  and  by  his  presence 
and  show  of  force  convinced  the  people  that  it  was  to  their  best 
interests  to  maintain  allegiance  to  the  Crown,  he  was  to  leave  in 
the  South  such  forces  as  he  might  consider  necessary  to  dominate 
the  territory,  and  send  the  remainder  to  the  Chesapeake  to  assist 
in  the  operations  which  were  to  be  undertaken  there  as  soon  as 
Clinton  was  relieved  of  the  apprehension  of  a  superior  fleet  and  the 
season  was  far  enough  advanced  to  permit  of  campaigning  in  that 
climate.  It  was  supposed  at  the  time  that  the  move  to  the  Chesa' 
peake  could  be  undertaken  in  September  or  the  early  part  of 
October.  Cornwallis  was  to  command  the  troops  which  would  be 
concentrated  for  this  operation. 

From  his  headquarters  in  the  field,  Cornwallis  corresponded 
with  loyalists  in  North  Carolina,  informing  them  of  his  hopes  for 
the  prompt  subjugation  of  South  Carolina  and  advising  with  them 
as  to  what  immediate  militant  acts,  if  any,  they  should  engage  in.  It 
was  not  desired  that  any  partisan  of  the  King  should  become  very 
active  in  the  field  at  this  time,  for  fear  that  the  rebels  would  like' 
wise  become  embodied  and  produce  a  situation  inimical  to  the 
success  of  his  army  when  it  approached  the  border  of  the  Province. 
However,  if  the  loyalists  considered  themselves  a  match  for  the 
Whigs,  and  were  determined  to  rise  without  further  delay,  he 
promised  all  the  assistance  in  his  power,  by  incursions  of  light 
infantry  and  furnishing  ammunition.  It  soon  became  evident  that 
this  hopeful  view  of  any  early  conquest  was  not  to  be  realized, 
for  there  were  many  questions  of  supply  and  transportation  to  be 
arranged  before  the  army  could  move  far  from  its  base,  and  matters 
of  civil  administration  to  be  adjusted,  so  that  the  government  of  the 
territory  in  rear  of  the  royal  army  would  offer  safety  to  the  troops. 

171 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

Cornwallis  had  established  bis  headquarters  at  Camden  while 
Clinton  and  Arbuthnot  were  still  at  Charleston.  On  their  depar- 
ture, June  5,  for  New  York,  the  responsibility  for  the  campaign, 
and  the  safety  of  the  loyalists  and  Tories  in  the  occupied  territory, 
rested  upon  Cornwallis  solely.  He  arranged  for  the  enrollment  of 
militia  under  the  British  flag,  for  the  organisation  and  functioning 
of  civil  administration,  and  modified  the  proclamations  issued  at 
Charleston  by  Clinton  and  Arbuthnot  June  1,  and  that  of  Clinton 
the  3d,  so  that  greater  protection  would  be  given  those  who  were 
loyal  to  the  Crown  and  more  severe  punishment  meted  out  to  those 
in  rebellion;  and  at  the  same  time  provided  for  the  needs  of  his 
army.  His  command  of  4,000  regular  troops  and  a  few  Provincials 
had  not  only  to  occupy  several  important  posts  widely  distant  from 
each  other,  but  from  their  numbers  maintain  in  the  field  a  force  of 
sufficient  strength  to  withstand  local  partisans  and  oppose  rein' 
forcing  troops  marching  from  the  north.  Posts  were  established 
from  the  Peedee  to  the  Savannah  to  awe  the  disaffected  and  encour' 
age  the  loyal  inhabitants,  and  measures  were  taken  to  raise  some 
Provincial  Corps  and  to  establish  a  militia,  as  well  for  the  defense 
as  for  the  internal  government  of  South  Carolina. 

In  the  district  of  Ninety  Six,  which  was  viewed  as  the  most 
populous  and  powerful  in  the  Province,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bal' 
four,  assisted  by  Major  Ferguson,  who  had  been  appointed  inspec- 
tor general  of  militia  by  Clinton,  formed  7  battalions  of  militia  of 
about  4,000  men,  which  organizations  were  so  regulated  that  they 
could  furnish  1,500  men  at  short  notice  for  the  defense  of  the  fron' 
tier,  or  for  any  other  home  service.  In  addition  to  the  militia,  a 
Provincial  Corps  of  500  men  was  commissioned  to  be  raised  under 
command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Cunningham. 

Other  battalions  of  militia  were  formed  along  the  extensive 
line — Broad  River  to  Cheraws— "but  they  were  in  general  either 
weak,  or  not  much  to  be  relied  on  for  their  fidelity.'"  The  refugees, 
who  were  now  returning  to  their  native  country,  were  organized 
into  the  First  South  Carolina  Regiment. 

181 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIJiGS    MOUHTAIH 

A  Provincial  Corps,  to  consist  of  500  men,  was  put  in  commission, 
to  be  raised  between  the  Peedee  and  Wateree,  under  the  command 
of  Major  Harrison.  In  order  to  protect,  the  raising  of  this  corps, 
and  to  awe  this  large  trad;  of  disaffected  country  the  Seventy 'first 
Regiment  and  a  troop  of  dragoons  under  Major  McArthur  were 
posted  at  Cheraw  Hill  on  the  Peedee. 

Other  small  posts  were  likewise  established  in  the  front  and  on 
the  left  of  Camden,  at  which  place  the  main  body  of  the  army  was 
posted,  and  which  was  considered  a  fairly  healthy  place  for  the 
troops. 

Having  made  the  above  arrangements,  and  everything  wearing 
the  face  of  tranquillity  and  submission,  Cornwallis  set  out  on  the 
21st  of  June  for  Charleston,  leaving  the  command  of  the  troops  on 
the  frontier  to  Lord  Rawdon,  who  was,  after  Brigadier  General 
Patterson,  the  commandant  at  Charleston,  the  next  in  rank  in  the 
southern  district. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Cornwallis  changed  the  instructions 
previously  given  his  friends  in  the  northern  Province  relative  to 
their  rising  in  aid  of  the  Crown.  He  now  considered  it  ill  advised 
to  march  his  army  through  North  Carolina  before  the  harvest,  and 
took  strong  measures  to  induce  impatient  partisans  not  to  rise  until 
after  the  crops  had  been  gathered,  and  under  no  conditions  to  act 
until  he  advised  them  that  the  time  was  propitious. 

On  June  30  he  wrote  to  Clinton  that  with  the  capitulation  of 
Ninety  Six,  and  the  dispersion  of  a  party  of  rebels  who  had  assem' 
bled  at  an  ironwork  on  the  northwest  border  of  the  Province,  there 
was  an  end  to  all  resistance  in  South  Carolina.  He  reported  the 
forces  of  the  enemy  in  North  Carolina  as  about  100  militia  under 
General  Caswell,  400  or  500  militia  at  or  near  Salisbury  under  Gen' 
eral  Rutherford,  and  300  Virginians  in  that  neighborhood  under 
Porterfield.  The  force  which  gave  him  the  most  concern,  however, 
was  2,000  Maryland  and  Delaware  troops  under  Major  General 
Baron  De  Kalb. 

Now  that  the  strongholds  in  the  northwest  part  of  South  Caro' 
lina  were  in  his  possession,  Cornwallis  thought  he  could  leave  this 

191 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUNTAIN 

Province  in  security,  and  march  about  the  beginning  of  September 
with  a  body  of  troops  into  the  back  part  of  North  Carolina,  "with 
the  greatest  probability  of  reducing  that  Province  to  its  duty." 
Having  in  mind  Clinton's  instructions  that  troops  which  could  be 
spared  later  would  be  used  at  a  probable  early  date  on  the  Chesa' 
peake,  Cornwallis  wrote  in  regard  to  his  contemplated  move  into 
North  Carolina: 

I  am  of  opinion  that  (besides  the  advantage  of  possessing  so  valuable  a  Prov 
ince)  it  would  prove  an  effectual  barrier  for  South  Carolina  and  Georgia;  and 
could  be  kept,  with  the  assistance  of  our  friends  there,  by  as  few  troops  as  would 
be  wanted  on  the  borders  of  this  Province,  if  North  Carolina  should  remain  in 
the  hands  of  our  enemies. 

This  hopeful  view  of  the  situation,  based  largely  upon  the  success 
of  the  royal  arms  up  to  this  time,  was  soon  to  be  shattered.  While 
Cornwallis  was  still  at  Charleston  his  intelligence  reported  that 
Sumter,  with  about  1,500  militia,  was  advancing  from  the  north  as 
far  as  the  Catawba  settlement,  and  that  many  disaffected  South 
Carolinians  from  theWaxhaw  and  other  settlements  on  the  frontier, 
whom  Lord  Rawdon  at  Camden  had  put  on  parole,  were  availing 
themselves  of  the  general  release  of  the  20th  of  June,  and  joining 
Sumter.  It  was  also  reported  that  De  Kalb's  army  was  continuing 
its  movement  south,  followed  by  2,500  Virginia  militia.  Cornwallis 
informed  Clinton  of  these  developments  in  a  letter  of  July  14, 
stating: 

The  effects  of  the  exertions  which  the  enemy  are  making  in  these  two  Prov- 
inces will,  I  make  no  doubt,  be  exaggerated  to  us.  But  upon  the  whole  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  their  plan  is  not  only  to  defend  North  Carolina,  but 
to  commence  offensive  operations  immediately;  which  reduces  me  to  the  neces- 
sity,  if  I  wanted  the  inclination,  of  following  the  plan  which  I  had  the  honor  of 
transmitting  to  your  excellency  in  my  letter  of  the  30th  of  June,  as  the  most 
effectual  means  of  keeping  up  the  spirits  of  our  friends  and  securing  this  Province. 

The  plan  referred  to  by  Cornwallis  was  the  occupation  of  North 
Carolina,  and  holding  it  as  the  frontier  of  the  southern  district. 

The  work  of  supplying  the  base  at  Camden  with  salt,  rum, 
regimental  stores,  arms,  and  ammunition  was  under  way,  so  that 

1 101 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUKTAIH 

a  further  advance  of  the  army  beyond  that  point  would  be  safe 
guarded.  Due  to  the  distance  of  transportation  and  the  excessive 
heat  of  the  season,  the  work  was  one  of  infinite  labor,  requiring  con' 
siderable  time.  Then,  too,  the  several  actions  in  which  his  forces 
had  been  engaged  made  Cornwallis  more  and  more  doubtful  as  to 
the  value  of  his  militia.  He  wrote  to  Clinton  that  dependence  upon 
these  troops  for  protecting  and  holding  in  South  Carolina,  in  case 
of  an  advance  of  his  army  into  North  Carolina,  was  precarious,  as 
their  want  of  subordination  and  confidence  in  themselves  would 
make  a  considerable  regular  force  always  necessary  for  the  defense 
of  the  Province,  until  North  Carolina  was  completely  subjugated. 

The  plan  of  campaign  of  the  Crown  forces  to  the  north  content 
plated  using  Ferguson's  corps,  augmented  by  militia  of  the  Ninety 
Six  district  who  were  being  trained  by  Ferguson,  as  a  left  covering 
force  to  advance  to  the  borders  of  Tryon  County,  now  Rutherford 
and  Lincoln,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  mountain  regions  in 
securing  protection  for  the  advance  of  the  main  body  from  Cam' 
den.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Cruger,  who  commanded  at  Ninety  Six, 
was  to  remain  there  with  his  corps.  Innes,  with  the  remainder  of 
the  militia  of  that  district,  was  to  guard  the  frontier,  which  would 
require  careful  attention,  as  there  were  many  disaffected,  and  many 
constantly  in  arms. 

The  continued  advance  southward  of  the  American  troops  pre' 
viously  reported  in  North  Carolina  was  known  to  Cornwallis. 
While  still  in  Charleston,  on  August  9,  he  received  an  express  from 
Camden  informing  him  that  General  Gates,  accompanied  by  Cas' 
well  and  Rutherford,  was  approaching  with  every  appearance  of 
an  intent  to  attack  Lord  Rawdon,  who  had  assembled  several  regi' 
ments  on  the  west  branch  of  Lynches  Creek.  These  troops  were 
more  or  less  sickly,  particularly  the  Seventy'first  Regiment,  the  two 
battalions  of  which  had  not  more  than  274  men  under  arms.  On 
the  6th  Sumter  had  attacked  the  British  post  at  Hanging  Rock, 
where  the  infantry  of  the  Legion  and  Governor  Browne's  corps 
were  posted.  He  had  been  repulsed,  but  not  without  difficulty. 

til! 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

These  accounts  alarmed  Cornwallis,  and  he  proceeded  from  Charles' 
ton  to  join  the  army  in  the  field.  At  the  same  time  he  wrote  to 
Clinton : 

If  we  succeed  at  present,  and  are  able  to  penetrate  into  North  Carolina, 
without  which  it  is  impossible  to  hold  this  province,  your  Excellency  will  see  the 
absolute  necessity  of  a  diversion  in  the  Chesapeake,  and  that  it  musT;  be  done  early. 

Cornwallis  reached  Camden  on  the  13th  of  August.  Gates's 
command  had  approached  very  close,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
16th  the  two  armies  met  and  fought  the  Battle  of  Camden,  resulting 
in  the  defeat  of  Gates.  Following  this  victory,  Cornwallis  deter' 
mined  upon  the  destruction  or  dispersion  of  the  corps  under  Sum' 
ter,  as  it  might  prove  a  foundation  for  assembling  the  routed  army, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  he  detached  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Tarleton  with  the  Legion  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  the  corps  of 
light  infantry,  in  all  about  350  men,  to  pursue  and  attack  Sumter. 
Orders  were  also  sent  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Turnbull  and  Major 
Ferguson,  on  the  Little  River,  to  put  their  corps  in  motion  immedi' 
ately,  and  on  their  side  to  pursue  and  attack  the  same  enemy. 
Tarleton  was  successful  in  surprising  Sumter  on  the  18th  at  Fish' 
ing  Creek,  near  the  Catawba.  The  latter,  with  a  corps  of  about 
800  men,  was  escorting  250  prisoners  and  a  large  quantity  of  stores, 
artillery,  and  ammunition.  Sumter  himself  escaped,  though  with 
difficulty,  but  his  whole  corps  was  killed,  taken,  or  dispersed. 

In  writing  of  the  Battle  of  Camden,  Cornwallis  stated  that  above 
1,000  were  killed  and  wounded,  and  about  800  taken  prisoners;  that 
his  army  captured  7  pieces  of  brass  cannon,  all  the  enemy  ammuni' 
tion,  wagons,  a  great  number  of  arms,  and  130  baggage  wagons;  "in 
short,  there  never  was  a  more  complete  victory.'11  The  British  loss 
was  reported  as  300  killed  and  wounded,  chiefly  of  the  Thirty 
third  Regiment  and  the  Volunteers  of  Ireland.  Among  the  Ameri' 
cans  wounded  were  Major  General  Baron  De  Kalb  and  Brigadier 
General  Rutherford.  Baron  De  Kalb  died  of  his  wounds.  In  a  letter 
to  Lord  Germain  written  August  21,  Cornwallis  said  that  on  arriv- 
ing  in  Camden  the  night  of  the  13th,  he  found  there  Lord  Raw' 

1121 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    M0UHTA1K 

don's  entire  force,  except  a  small  detachment  under  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Turnbull,  which  fell  back  from  Rocky  Mount  to  Major 
Ferguson's  posts  of  the  militia  at  Ninety  Six,  on  Little  River. 

I  had  my  option  to  make,  either  to  retire  or  attack  the  enemy,  for  the  position 
at  Camden  was  a  bad  one  to  be  attacked  in,  and  by  General  Sumpter's  advancing 
down  the  Wateree,  my  supplies  must  have  failed  me  in  a  few  days. 

These  two  decisive  engagements,  following  so  closely  upon  each 
other,  brought  deep  despair  to  the  revolutionists  and  great  elation 
to  the  vidtors.  In  Cornwallis's  letter  to  Lord  Germain  referred  to 
above  and  written  five  days  after  Camden  and  three  days  after  the 
defeat  of  Sumter,  he  declared  that  the  rebel  forces  were  dispersed 
and  that  internal  commotions  and  insurrections  in  the  Province 
would  now  subside.  He  stated  that  he  had  given  directions  to  inflict 
exemplary  punishment  on  some  of  the  most  guilty,  in  hopes  to  deter 
others  in  future  "from  tampering  with  allegiance,  with  oaths,  and 
with  the  lenity  and  generosity  of  the  British  Government."  The 
orders  of  Cornwallis  were  that  all  inhabitants  of  the  Province  who 
had  submitted,  and  later  took  part  in  the  revolt  against  the  King, 
should  be  punished  with  the  greatest  vigor,  imprisoned,  and  their 
property  taken  or  destroyed.  He  ordered  in  the  most  positive  man' 
ner  that  every  militiaman  who  had  borne  arms  under  him,  and 
afterwards  joined  the  enemy,  should  be  immediately  hanged.  Cru' 
ger,  who  commanded  at  Ninety  Six,  was  directed  to  take  the  most 
vigorous  measures  to  extinguish  the  rebellion  in  his  district,  and  to 
obey  in  the  strictest  manner  the  directions  given  relative  to  the 
treatment  of  the  country.  It  will  be  seen  later  how  the  execution 
of  these  instructions  in  the  region  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  Alle' 
ghenies  resulted  in  the  mountain  men  swarming  from  their  homes 
to  defend  their  freedom  and  independence. 

Now  that  no  further  opposition  to  the  advance  into  North 
Carolina  existed,  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  of  September  Corn' 
wallis  dispatched  messengers  into  that  Province  with  directions  to 
his  friends  there  to  take  arms  and  assemble  immediately,  and  to 
seizie  the  most  violent  people  and  all  the  military  stores  and  maga' 

lis! 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

2jnes  belonging  to  the  rebels,  and  to  intercept  all  stragglers  from 
the  routed  army.  He  promised  to  march  without  loss  of  time  to 
their  support.  Much  to  Cornwallis's  disappointment,  however, 
the  people  of  the  northern  Province  were  not  as  prompt  in  rising 
as  he  had  hoped.  Their  inclinations  were  held  in  check  due  to  the 
large  number  of  revolutionists  whom  they  had  observed  marching 
to  the  south  to  oppose  the  royal  forces,  and  they  preferred  to  await 
the  arrival  of  the  British  Army  in  their  neighborhood  before  taking 
an  open  stand.  Cornwallis  was  hopeful  that  Clinton  would  start, 
at  an  early  date,  the  contemplated  move  to  the  Chesapeake,  thereby 
relieving  the  situation  on  his  northern  front.  He  wrote  to  him  that 
next  to  the  security  of  New  York,  the  operations  in  the  Chesapeake 
were  one  of  the  most  important  objects  of  the  war. 

About  this  time  Major  Wemyss  was  sent  with  a  detachment  of 
the  Sixty'third  Regiment,  mounted,  some  refugees,  Provincials,  and 
militia,  to  disarm  in  the  most  rigid  manner  the  country  between 
the  Santee  and  Peedee,  and  to  punish  severely  all  those  who  sub' 
mitted  or  pretended  to  live  peaceably  under  bis  majesty's  Govern' 
ment  since  the  reduction  of  Charleston,  and  who  had  later  revolted. 
Cornwallis  himself  ordered  several  militiamen  to  be  executed,  who 
had  voluntarily  enrolled  and  borne  arms  under  the  British  flag  and 
afterwards  revolted  to  the  enemy. 

Plans  were  made  to  move  the  first  division  of  the  army  into 
North  Carolina  by  way  of  Charlotte  Town  and  Salisbury,  about 
September  6  or  7-  The  second  division  would  follow  in  about  10 
days  with  convalescents  and  stores.  A  more  prompt  move  follow 
ing  the  successes  at  Camden  and  Fishing  Creek  could  not  be  made, 
due  to  the  number  of  sick  and  wounded,  and  the  want  of  transport. 
The  advance  was  started  on  the  8th  and  Charlotte  Town  reached 
the  26th  of  September. 

During  September  Ferguson  operated  in  Ninety  Six  and  from 
there  moved  into  what  had  been  Tryon  County,  North  Carolina, 
accompanied  by  about  800  militia  collected  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Ninety  Six.  Protection  was  to  be  given  to  the  friends  of  the 

I  Hi 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    M0UHTA1H 

Crown,  who  were  supposed  to  be  numerous  in  that  locality,  and  it 
was  intended  that  he  should  pass  the  Catawba  River  and  endeavor 
to  preserve  tranquillity  in  the  rear  and  flank  of  the  army.  It  was 
while  on  this  duty  that  the  loss  of  his  entire  command  occurred 
at  Kings  Mountain  on  the  7th  of  the  following  month.  Without 
some  knowledge  of  Cornwallis's  campaign  in  South  Carolina,  and 
from  thence  into  North  Carolina  as  far  as  Charlotte  Town,  the 
necessity  for  his  immediate  retirement  from  the  northern  Province, 
following  Kings  Mountain,  would  not  be  understood.  It  is  now 
necessary  to  refer  to  the  group  of  leaders  and  the  troops  which  they 
commanded,  who  succeeded,  so  unexpectedly  and  so  decisively, 
in  dealing  this  staggering  blow  to  Ferguson,  and  in  compelling 
Cornwallis  to  place  his  army  on  the  defensive. 


115! 


1161 


Part  II 


GATHERING  OF  THE  PATRIOTS  ~»THE  BATTLE 


!T  will  be  recalled  that  following  the  defeat 
of  General  Gates  at  Camden  on  the  16th  of 
August,  Cornwallis  issued  immediate  instruc 
tions  to  his  two  flying  groups  under  Tarleton 
and  Ferguson,  to  pursue  Colonel  Sumter,  who, 
following  the  dispersion  of  Gates's  forces,  had 
the  only  organised  corps  of  patriots  in  South 
Carolina.  These  instructions,  together  with  detailed  information 
of  the  magnitude  of  the  defeat  of  the  troops  under  Gates,  reached 
Ferguson  on  the  19th.  Immediate  preparations  were  made  to  com' 
ply  with  the  orders,  and  at  7  in  the  evening  Ferguson  put  his 
column  in  motion.  At  that  moment  an  express  arrived  from  Colonel 
Innes,  who  was  on  his  way  from  Ninety  Six  to  join  Ferguson, 
informing  him  that  he  had  been  attacked  at  Musgroves  Mills  on 
the  Enoree  River  on  the  18th,  with  severe  loss,  and  asking  for  sup' 
port,  as  his  militia  had  deserted  him.  Ferguson  altered  his  plans 
and  marched  in  the  direction  of  Innes,  crossing  the  Broad  at  sunrise. 
The  troops  which  had  engaged  the  Loyalists  and  Tories  on  the 
Enoree  were  commanded  by  Colonels  Williams,  Shelby,  and  Clarke. 
Following  this  success,  a  move  against  Cruger,  commanding  at 
Ninety  Six,  was  contemplated,  but  just  at  this  time  word  was 
received  of  the  defeat  of  the  patriots  at  Camden  two  days  before, 
and  following  a  council  of  the  commanders  it  was  decided  to  rejoin 
McDowell's  corps.  Due  to  the  nearness  of  Ferguson,  the  march 
northward,  encumbered  by  prisoners,  was  one  of  many  difficulties, 
and  it  was  with  great  relief  that  Williams's  party  rejoined  McDow 
ell's  corps  in  the  mountains  at  Gilbert  Town,  to  which  point  the 
latter  had  retired.  Here  the  seriousness  of  the  cause  of  the  patriots 
was  discussed.  It  was  thought  that  Ferguson  would  immediately 

1173 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUHTAIH 

advance  to  overtake  them,  and  further  withdrawal  into  the  momv 
tains  seemed  expedient.  It  was  proposed  by  Shelby  and  Sevier, 
who  were  from  the  counties  of  North  Carolina  where  the  waters 
flowed  to  the  westward,  and  now  part  of  Tennessee,  that  the 
troops  should  disband,  and  all  return  to  their  homes  to  raise  an 
army  of  volunteers  to  defeat  Ferguson,  or  any  other  leader  who 
might  operate  along  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  This 
proposition  received  general  support,  and  Shelby  and  Sevier,  with 
their  followers,  departed  for  their  backwater  homes,  and  word  was 
sent  to  the  leaders  of  Wilkes  and  Surry  Counties  to  embody  their 
followers  and  prepare  for  a  rising. 

This  was  a  period  of  great  distress  to  the  patriotic  cause  through' 
out  the  entire  State.  It  was  only  the  mountains  that  furnished 
refuge  for  those  who  still  refused  to  accept  British  sovereignty,  and 
a  number  of  refugees,  especially  those  who  had  borne  arms  against 
the  King,  were  seeking  protection  within  their  barriers. 

Following  the  quick  withdrawal  of  Colonel  Williams  and  his 
confederated  command  from  Musgroves  Mills,  Ferguson  made  no 
effort  to  pursue  him.  His  marches  from  day  to  day  were  short,  and 
on  the  23d  of  August  he  left  his  command  to  go  to  Camden  to  con' 
fer  with  Cornwallis,  rejoining  his  troops  September  1,  with  the 
news  that  his  Provincial  Corps  were  to  be  separated  from  the  army 
and  act  on  the  frontier  with  the  militia.  During  the  following  week 
he  marched  to  the  northward,  and  on  the  7th  of  September  his 
command  crossed  into  North  Carolina,  and  he,  with  about  50  of 
the  American  volunteers  and  300  militia,  proceeded  to  Gilbert 
Town,  to  surprise  a  party  of  patriots  who  were  reported  there. 
On  the  following  day  the  remainder  of  the  command  moved  to  the 
Broad,  where  on  the  10th  their  commander  rejoined  them. 

While  Ferguson  was  at  Gilbert  Town  he  paroled  one  of  his 
prisoners  and  sent  him  into  the  mountains  with  a  message  to  the 
leaders  there,  "that  if  they  did  not  desist  from  their  opposition  to 
the  British  arms,  and  take  protection  under  his  standard,  he  would 
march  his  army  over  the  mountains,  hang  their  leaders,  and  lay 
their  country  waste  with  fire  and  sword." 

1181 


THE  BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

The  effect  of  this  message  was  to  augment  the  determination  of 
the  mountain  leaders  to  get  together  their  men  with  all  speed  pos' 
sible  and  march  against  their  hated  enemy.  The  magnitude  of  their 
undertaking  was  fully  appreciated,  especially  as  many  of  these 
mountain  settlements  were  of  but  recent  creation,  and  the  inhabit' 
ants  not  very  numerous,  and  without  security  from  the  Cherokees, 
except  such  as  was  furnished  by  their  own  trusty  rifles. 

As  the  adjacent  territory  of  Virginia  was  equally  interested  in 
stopping  the  advance  of  this  hostile  invader,  cooperation  and  assis' 
tance  of  the  Washington  County  troops  was  sought.  Early  in  Sep' 
tember  the  county  lieutenant,  Col.  Arthur  Campbell,  was  in 
Richmond,  and  in  an  interview  with  the  Governor  of  Virginia  was 
informed  of  the  measures  about  to  be  taken  to  retrieve  the  misfor' 
tunes  of  the  troops  under  Gates  and  Sumter.  He  returned  to  his 
western  home  imbued  with  the  idea  of  the  part  his  militia  should 
take  in  the  ensuing  campaign,  and  at  once  showed  a  willingness 
and  desire  to  cooperate  in  the  undertaking  that  Shelby,  Sevier,  and 
others  were  engaged  in. 

Ferguson's  withdrawal  southward  from  Gilbert  Town  on  the 
10th  of  September  was  for  the  purpose  of  rejoining  the  main  part 
of  his  command,  which  had  taken  a  stand  on  the  Broad  to  keep  a 
lookout  for  a  reputed  body  of  Georgians  who  were  approaching. 
The  following  morning  he  put  his  assembled  command  in  motion, 
and  on  the  12th  led  a  small  party  to  the  head  of  Cane  Creek  in 
Burke  County,  in  pursuit  of  McDowell  and  his  refugee  followers, 
who  were  on  their  way  over  the  mountains  to  seek  shelter  pending 
the  assembly  of  the  various  county  regiments  that  were  to  move 
against  Ferguson.  A  slight  skirmish  resulted,  but  McDowell's 
force  was  able  to  extricate  itself  and  continue  its  retirement  with 
but  few  losses.  The  pursuit  was  continued  on  the  15th  and  16th 
to  the  banks  of  the  Catawba,  where,  at  Quaker  Meadows,  was  the 
home  of  the  McDowells,  but  the  pursuers  arrived  too  late,  as 
the  refugees  were  well  on  their  way  into  the  mountains. 

In  the  ensuing  week  Ferguson  campaigned  from  the  Catawba  to 
the  Second  Broad,  and  on  the  23d  entered  Gilbert  Town  for  the 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUJiTAIK 

second  time.  The  following  day  was  busily  occupied  in  receiving 
500  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  contiguous  territory,  who  came  in  to 
profess  their  allegiance  to  the  King.  It  was  on  this  day  that  intelli- 
gence was  received  from  Colonel  Cruger  of  an  adtion  which  had 
just  occurred  at  Augusta,  and  to  which  reference  will  be  made,  as 
it  had  a  decided  bearing  upon  Ferguson's  future  plans. 

Early  in  September  Colonel  Clarke  assembled  a  body  of  troops 
and  marched  to  attack  the  British  post  at  Augusta.  He  reached  his 
destination  on  the  14th,  and  found  that  the  commanding  officer, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Browne,  with  the  assistance  of  some  friendly 
Indians,  had  taken  a  position  in  a  fort  about  3  miles  from  Augusta. 
Clarke  invested  the  position  for  five  days,  when  he  retired  upon 
the  approach  of  Cruger,  who  had  hastened  with  assistance  from 
Ninety  Six,  upon  learning  of  the  danger  to  this  frontier  post.  It  is 
known  that  Cruger's  message  to  Ferguson  informing  him  of  these 
events  reached  the  latter  at  Gilbert  Town  on  the  24th,  five  days 
after  Clarke  withdrew  from  the  vicinity  of  Augusta  to  fall  back 
upon  the  protection  of  the  mountains.  This  retirement  placed  him 
between  Cruger  and  Ferguson,  and  Cruger  asked  the  latter  to  coop' 
erate  with  him  in  cutting  Clarke  off  before  he  could  reach  a  retreat 
in  the  mountains.  With  this  plan  in  view,  Ferguson  left  Gilbert 
Town  on  the  27th  and  moved  to  the  Broad,  and  then  to  the  Green 
River  to  await  in  the  vicinity  of  their  junction  further  intelligence 
of  Clarke.  By  the  30th,  however,  Ferguson  knew  that  his  efforts 
to  intercept  Clarke  on  his  return  to  the  mountains  were  unsuccess' 
ful,  as  the  latter  had  taken  another  route.  In  the  meanwhile  Cruger 
found  that  the  pursuit  of  Clarke  would  carry  him  too  far  from 
Ninety  Six,  and  as  he  was  responsible  for  its  safety,  he  returned  to 
that  post.  At  this  time  Ferguson  was  in  possession  of  the  definite 
information  of  the  advance  of  the  army  of  mountain  men,  who  had 
started  their  march  from  Watauga  on  the  26th. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  retirement  of  Col.  Charles 
McDowell  from  his  home,  with  his  band  of  soldiers  and  refugees. 
He  reached  the  shelter  of  the  backwaters  with  a  force  of  160  men 

1201 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

from  Burke  and  Rutherford  Counties.  To  this  rendezvous  on  the 
Sycamore  Flats,  bordering  the  Watauga,  about  2}4  miles  south' 
west  of  the  present  town  of  Elizabethton,  Col.  Arthur  Campbell 
sent  his  brother 'in'law,  Col.  William  Campbell,  with  200  militia 
from  Washington  County,  Va.  Later  on  he  led  to  the  same  place 
an  additional  force  of  200  men  who  joined  the  first  group.  It 
was  necessary  for  Col.  Arthur  Campbell  to  return  to  the  county 
under  his  jurisdiction  and  take  measures  to  protect  it  from  the 
invasion  of  hostile  Indians.  Shelby,  at  the  head  of  240  men  from 
Sullivan  County,  and  Sevier,  with  an  equal  number  from  Wash' 
ington  County,  N.  C,  joined  at  the  designated  meeting  point 
on  the  Watauga  on  the  25th  of  September. 

David  Ramsey,  in  his  history  of  South  Carolina,  written  in  1808, 
said  that  "hitherto  these  mountaineers  had  only  heard  of  war  at  a 
distance,  and  had  been  in  peaceable  possession  of  that  independ' 
ence  for  which  their  countrymen  on  the  seacoast  were  contending." 
They  embodied  to  check  the  invader  of  their  own  volition,  "with' 
out  any  requisition  from  the  Governments  of  America  or  the  officers 
of  the  Continental  Army."  Each  man  set  out  with  a  knapsack, 
blanket,  and  gun.  All  who  could  obtain  horses  were  mounted;  the 
remainder  afoot.  There  is  a  tradition  that  before  starting  out  on 
the  journey  from  which  many  would  never  return,  the  Scotch' Irish 
Presbyterian  clergyman  of  the  settlement  invoked  a  blessing  and 
besought  divine  protection  and  guidance  for  the  army. 

The  highway  of  their  great  adventure  followed  the  only  roadway 
connecting  the  backwater  country  with  the  eastern  slopes  of  the 
Blue  Ridge  in  North  Carolina.  Leaving  Sycamore  Flats,  the  column 
marched  up  Gap  Creek  to  its  headwaters  in  Gap  Creek  Mountain, 
and  there  turned  eastward  and  then  south,  following  around  the 
base  of  Fork  Mountain  to  Toe  River,  and  on  up  that  stream  to  one 
of  its  tributaries.  Here  the  route  continued  in  a  southerly  direction 
until  the  top  of  the  mountain  was  reached,  between  Roan  High 
Knob  and  Big  Yellow  Mountain.  From  the  mountain  top,  descent 
was  made  along  Roaring  Creek  to  the  North  Toe  River.  It  is  stated 

1211 


THE    BATTLE    OF   K1HGS    MOUH^AIH 

in  the  diary  of  Ensign  Robert  Campbell  that  the  mountains  were 
crossed  and  descent  to  the  other  side  was  smarted  before  camp  was 
made  for  the  night.  Snow  was  encountered  in  the  highlands,  for 
an  elevation  of  5,500  feet  was  reached  in  this  march.  On  the  top  of 
the  mountain  there  was  found  a  hundred  acres  of  beautiful  table' 
land,  and  the  troops  were  paraded,  doubtless  for  the  purpose  of 
seeing  how  they  were  standing  the  march,  which  was  about  26 
miles  to  this  point.  Campbell's  diary  spates  that  the  second  night — 
that  of  the  27th — they  rested  at  Cathey's  plantation.  This  is  placed 
by  Draper  at  the  junction  of  Grassy  Creek  and  North  Toe  River. 
The  diary  does  not  mention  the  camping  place  of  the  28th.  On 
this  day  McDowell,  who  had  previously  left  the  column  to  go  to 
his  home  in  Rutherford  County,  returned  with  such  information 
as  he  had  been  able  to  secure  relative  to  the  movements  of  Ferguson. 
The  night  of  the  28th  a  council  of  officers  was  held,  at  which  it  was 
agreed  that  an  experienced  officer  was  needed  to  take  command  of 
all  separate  county  units.  It  was  decided  that  Colonel  McDowell 
should  convey  a  message  to  General  Gates,  asking  that  General 
Morgan  or  General  Davidson  be  sent  to  them  to  take  over  the 
command. 

Tradition  has  it  that  on  reaching  Gillespie  Gap  the  troops  divided, 
one  group,  including  Campbell's  men,  moving  south  to  Turkey 
Cove,  the  others  going  easterly  to  the  North  Cove  on  the  North 
Fork  of  the  Catawba.  Ensign  Campbell's  diary  gives  the  informa' 
tion  that  the  fourth  night,  the  29th,  Campbell's  men  rested  at  a 
rich  "Tory's,"  and  this  place  has  been  identified  as  being  in  Turkey 
Cove. 

The  following  day  the  men  who  had  camped  at  North  Cove 
marched  southeast  down  Paddy  Creek,  while  those  from  Turkey 
Cove  marched  southerly  down  the  North  Fork  and  then  easterly 
down  the  Catawba.  The  two  forces  joined  on  the  banks  of  the 
Catawba  near  the  mouth  of  Paddy  Creek,  and  continued  down  the 
Catawba  to  Quaker  Meadows,  the  home  of  the  McDowells,  where 
camp  was  made,  after  a  march  of  about  27  miles  for  the  southern 

1221 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUNTAIN 

column  and  about  23  for  the  northern.  During  the  five  days  which 
had  elapsed  since  leaving  Sycamore  Flats,  about  80  miles  had  been 
covered. 

Here  the  marching  column  of  1,040  men  was  joined  by  Colonel 
Cleveland  with  the  men  from  Wilkes  and  Major  Winston  with  the 
men  from  Surry,  350  in  all,  making  a  combined  strength  of  1,390. 
The  time  was  now  opportune  for  Colonel  McDowell  to  depart 
for  General  Gates's  headquarters,  with  the  request  of  the  several 
colonels  that  a  general  officer  be  designated  for  the  command, 
and  after  turning  his  regiment  over  to  his  brother,  Maj.  Joseph 
McDowell,  he  departed  on  this  mission  the  1st  of  October. 

We  left  Ferguson  on  September  30,  at  which  time  he  had  given 
up  hopes  of  cutting  off  Clarke's  force.  His  camp  was  at  Step's  plan' 
ration,  12  miles  from  Denards  Ford  of  the  Broad  River.  Being 
aware  that  the  gathering  hordes  of  the  enemy  were  either  at  a  con' 
centration  point  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  or  approaching  it,  Ferguson 
wrote  to  Cruger  on  the  30th  informing  him  of  this  new  threat,  and 
suggested  that  it  would  be  well  if  the  district  of  Ninety  Six  called 
out  more  of  its  militia. 

The  following  day  Ferguson  began  his  withdrawal  from  the 
vicinity  of  the  mountains.  He  marched  to  Denards  Ford,  where 
he  camped,  and  issued  his  last  appeal  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
region  to  join  the  militia  serving  under  the  King.  As  it  is  typical  of 
the  inflammatory  proclamations  put  forth  by  both  Whig  and  Tory 
during  this  period  of  violent  passions  it  is  here  given: 

Denards  Ford,  Broad  River, 
Tryon  County,  October  1, 1780. 
Gentlemen  :  Unless  you  wish  to  be  eat  up  by  an  inundation  of  barbarians,  who 
have  begun  by  murdering  an  unarmed  son  before  the  aged  father,  and  afterwards 
lopped  off  his  arms,  and  who  by  their  shocking  cruelties  and  irregularities,  give 
the  best  proof  of  their  cowardice  and  want  of  discipline;  I  say,  if  you  wish  to  be 
pinioned,  robbed,  and  murdered,  and  see  your  wives  and  daughters,  in  four  days, 
abused  by  the  dregs  of  mankind — in  short,  if  you  wish  or  deserve  to  live  and 
bear  the  name  of  men,  grasp  your  arms  in  a  moment  and  run  to  camp. 

K23J 


THE    BATTLE   OF   KIHGS   MOUNTAIN 

The  backwater  men  have  crossed  the  mountains;  McDowell,  Hampton, 
Shelby,  and  Cleveland  are  at  their  head,  so  that  you  know  what  you  have  to 
depend  upon.  If  you  choose  to  be  degraded  forever  and  ever  by  a  set  of  mongrels, 
say  so  at  once,  and  let  your  women  turn  their  backs  upon  you,  and  look  out  for 
real  men  to  protect  them.  pAT  Ferguson> 

Major,  Seventy firM:  Regiment. 

Ferguson  continued  his  march  at  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  2d,  proceeding  4  miles,  then  forming  line  of  adtion  and  lying 
on  his  arms  all  night.  The  following  morning  he  got  under  way  at 
an  early  hour,  and  after  a  long  march  down  the  Broad,  halted  for 
the  night  at  Tate's  plantation,  1  mile  after  crossing  Buffalo  Creek. 
These  three  marches  brought  Ferguson's  command  38  miles  nearer 
Charlotte  Town  and  Corn  walks  than  was  his  camp  of  September 
29  and  30.  From  Tate's  plantation,  where  he  remained  until  4 
o'clock  the  morning  of  the  6th,  to  Charlotte  Town  was  50  miles. 
In  this  position  he  could  feel  sufficiently  close  to  the  main  army  to 
be  reinforced  from  it  should  the  necessity  arise.  At  the  same  time 
further  intelligence  would  be  received  of  the  route  taken  by  the 
mountain  men,  and  their  probable  intentions;  and  a  reply  to  his 
letter  of  September  30  could  be  awaited.  Cruger's  reply,  which 
was  dated  October  3,  was  probably  received  at  Tate's  plantation, 
and  doubtless  prompted  Ferguson  to  leave  that  camp  and  take  up 
a  position  from  which  to  offer  battle.  This  letter  was  found  on 
Ferguson's  body,  and  as  it  was  somewhat  mutilated,  its  complete 
contents  is  not  known.  Nothing  in  the  letter  indicated  that  Cruger 
was  going  to  take  any  immediate  adtion.  He  said: 

I  don't  see  how  you  can  possibly  ([defendj  the  country  and  its  neighborhood 
that  you  fare}  now  in.  The  game  from  the  mountains  is  just  what  I  expected. 
Am  glad  to  find  you  so  capitally  supported  by  the  friends  to  government  in 
North  Carolina.  I  flattered  myself  they  would  have  been  equal  to  the  mountain 
lads,  and  that  no  further  call  for  the  defensive  would  have  been  fmadej  on  this 
part  of  the  Province.  I  begin  to  think  our  views  for  the  present  rather  large. 

Cruger  evidently  believed  that  Ferguson  had  a  difficult  situation 
to  face,  but  that  he  was  equal  to  the  emergency,  and,  without 

1241 


THE   BATTLE   OF   KIHGS    MOUKTAIH 

doubt,  this  was  Ferguson's  opinion  also.  At  this  time  he  knew  the 
mountain  men  were  in  the  vicinity  of  his  camp  site  of  September  30, 
28  miles  away,  and  that  a  day's  march  of  those  who  were  mounted 
would  bring  the  enemy  upon  him,  so  in  going  to  "Little  King  Moun' 
tain,"  as  Allaire  designates  the  place,  on  the  6th,  and  taking  up 
a  position  which  was  most  favorable  for  defense,  and  remaining 
there  for  24  hours  before  the  enemy  came  in  sight,  Ferguson  acted 
with  deliberation  and  with  full  intent  to  engage  in  battle,  did  the 
enemy  take  the  initiative.  The  "Little  King  Mountain"  position 
was  about  36  miles  from  Charlotte  Town,  and  had  Ferguson  desired 
to  avoid  battle  with  the  mountain  men,  he  could  have  marched  on 
the  morning  of  the  7th  halfway  to  army  headquarters. 

The  letter  which  Ferguson  wrote  to  Cornwallis  October  6,  in 
which  he  said,  "I  am  on  my  march  towards  you,  by  a  road  leading 
from  Cherokee  Ford,  north  of  Kings  Mountain.  Three  or  four 
hundred  good  soldiers,  part  dragoons,  would  finish  the  business. 
Something  must  be  done  soon.  This  is  their  last  push  in  this  quar' 
ter,"  is  indicative  of  the  subordinate  commander  whose  duty  it  is 
to  keep  his  superior  informed  of  the  forces  opposed  to  him,  and, 
when  the  enemy  is  in  such  strength  as  to  be  a  serious  menace,  to 
suggest  that  reinforcement  would  insure  a  more  certain  success. 
In  this  letter  Ferguson  mentioned  that  "they  are  since  joined  by 
Clarke  and  Sumpter."  Ferguson  had  the  mistaken  idea  that  Clarke, 
on  his  withdrawal  northward  from  Augusta  to  the  mountains,  had 
joined  the  mountain  men.  Some  of  the  men  of  Sumter's  command, 
under  Colonel  Williams,  did  join  about  this  time,  as  will  be  noted 
later. 

When  the  mountain  men  left  their  rendezvous  on  the  Catawba 
October  1,  they  marched  to  the  southward,  up  Silver  Creek,  past 
Pilot  Mountain,  and  from  thence  down  Cane  Creek  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Gilbert  Town.  Although  the  several  organization  command' 
ers  had  sent  to  Gates  for  an  officer  to  command,  it  was  considered 
unwise  to  continue  further  without  coordinated  leadership,  and  on 
this  day  a  conference  was  held  which  resulted  in  the  selection  of 

1251 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KI?iGS    MOUNTAIN 

Colonel  Campbell  to  command  all  the  groups,  until  a  general  officer 
should  arrive.  The  command  was  intrusted  to  the  colonel  of  the 
Virginia  regiment  to  prevent  dispute  were  an  attempt  made  to 
name  a  leader  from  the  North  Carolina  colonels. 

On  the  2d  the  march  was  continued  toward  Gilbert  Town,  from 
which  Ferguson  had  departed  five  days  previous.  Continuing  on 
to  the  south,  the  Cowpens  were  reached  on  the  6th,  the  march 
being  directed  toward  Ninety  Six,  as  it  was  thought  Ferguson  was 
falling  back  in  the  direction  of  Cruger.  At  the  Cowpens  Col.  James 
Williams,  of  South  Carolina,  with  400  men,  joined.  This  new  party 
was  made  up  largely  of  groups  of  Sumter's  men  from  South  Caro- 
lina,  under  Colonels  Hill  and  Lacey,  of  men  from  Lincoln  County 
under  Graham,  Hambright,  and  Chronicle,  and  a  small  number 
embodied  by  Colonel  Williams  in  North  Carolina.  On  the  2d  of 
October  Williams  had  written  to  General  Gates  that  with  a  force  of 
450  horsemen  he  was  in  pursuit  of  Ferguson,  and  that  he  expected 
to  join  the  mountain  men  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  purpose. 

Colonel  Campbell  was  informed  by  the  new  arrivals  that  the 
enemy  lay  encamped  somewhere  near  the  Cherokee  Ford  of  the 
Broad  River,  and  plans  were  made  for  immediate  pursuit.  A  coun' 
cil  of  the  principal  officers  was  held,  and  it  was  decided  to  select 
900  of  the  best  horsemen  and  leave  the  weak  horses  and  footmen 
to  follow  as  fast  as  possible. 

Time  was  pressing,  and  the  necessity  for  immediate  action  great, 
for  if  Ferguson  continued  his  withdrawal  in  the  direction  of  Char' 
lotte  Town  another  day's  march,  he  would  be  so  near  the  main 
army  that  to  engage  him  would  be  a  most  ha2ardous  enterprise.  As 
soon,  therefore,  as  the  selected  group  was  formed,  the  command 
mounted,  and  at  8  o'clock  started  on  its  long  night  ride,  which  the 
next  day  was  to  terminate  in  the  encounter  so  eagerly  sought. 

Cherokee  Ford  of  the  Broad  was  crossed  early  in  the  morning, 
and  the  march  continued  along  the  northeast  road  topping  the  ridge 
between  Buffalo  and  Kings  Creeks.  Information  was  received  from 
several  people  as  to  Ferguson's  line  of  march  the  day  before,  and 

1261 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KI^GS    MOUTiTAIK 

finally  as  to  the  mountain  top  on  which  his  camp  was  established. 
This  camp  site  could  best  be  reached  by  way  of  the  main  highway 
running  from  North  Carolina  in  a  southeast  direction  to  Yorkville, 
S.  C,  so  the  eager  patriots  hastened  their  march  to  gain  this  road, 
passing  Antioch  Church  and  Ponders  Branch,  and  stopping  on  the 
way  only  long  enough  to  gain  additional  information.  When  the 
highway  was  reached,  the  column  turned  southeast,  and  after  cross' 
ing  Kings  Creek  began  the  gradual  ascent  of  the  rugged  hills  which 
lay  between  the  creek  and  the  enemy's  position.  An  uncomfort' 
able  rain  had  added  to  the  weariness  of  the  sleepless  marchers,  but 
about  noon  the  weather  cleared,  the  sun  shone  with  grateful 
warmth,  and  the  nearness  of  the  quarry  added  ?est  to  the  chase. 

About  a  mile  from  Kings  Creek  the  road  passed  between  two 
slight  knobs,  and  as  the  patriots  emerged  from  the  bottom  of  the 
ravine  between  these  knolls,  they  found  themselves  upon  a  small 
plateau,  overlooking  to  the  southeast  a  sharp  ravine,  the  far  side  of 
which  terminated  in  a  ridge,  part  of  which  was  a  hundred  feet 
higher  than  the  plateau,  and  on  which  Ferguson  stood  and  offered 
battle.  The  broadside  silhouette  of  the  ridge  was  visible  about 
700  yards  away,  but  the  tree'covered  slopes  hid  its  occupants  from 
view. 

Continuing  along  the  highway  to  the  southeast  for  several  hwv 
dred  yards,  to  a  point  where  the  plateau  terminates  and  the  road 
begins  its  descent  into  the  ravine,  a  better  view  of  Ferguson's  posi- 
tion was  obtained.  Beyond  this  point  the  column  could  not  proceed 
until  definite  plans  for  the  attack  had  been  determined  upon.  The 
characteristics  of  the  mountain  on  which  Ferguson  was  making  his 
stand  were  known  to  several  of  Campbell's  command,  and  this 
information  imparted  to  his  leaders.  While  halted  in  the  position 
which  they  had  now  reached,  with  the  mountain  occupied  by  the 
enemy  in  sight,  the  plan  of  battle  was  finally  agreed  upon.  They 
could  see  a  ridge  about  600  yards  long,  the  general  direction  of 
which  extended  north  52°  east.  The  highest  point  of  the  ridge  was 
near  its  southwest  end,  from  which  point,  toward  the  southwest, 

1271 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUNTAIN 

there  was  a  gradual  dropping  off  of  20  feet  to  a  very  narrow  hog' 
back,  then  a  widening  out  of  the  terrain  into  a  gently  sloping, 
narrow  plateau,  which  extended  due  north  to  the  place  where  the 
column  had  debouched  from  the  ravine  between  the  two  knobs. 

From  the  highest  point  of  the  ridge,  along  its  crest  to  the  north' 
east,  there  was  a  gradual  descent  for  400  yards,  then  a  very  sharp 
drop  to  the  highway.  The  northern  face  of  the  ridge  descended  to 
a  stream  which  flows  into  Clarks  Fork.  The  south  face  of  the  moun' 
tain  was  unknown  to  the  leaders,  except  as  described  by  those 
familiar  with  its  features.  From  them  it  was  learned  that  another 
stream  led  from  the  south  of  the  mountain,  and  that  several  slight 
spurs  projected  from  the  ridge  to  the  east  and  southeast,  which 
gradually  flattened  out  into  comparatively  level  ground. 

The  plan  of  attack  decided  upon  was  to  surround  the  mountain 
and  trap  its  defenders  in  a  band  of  fire,  constantly  decreasing  in 
diameter  as  the  mountain  sides  were  scaled.  To  accomplish  this 
maneuver,  the  command  was  divided  into  four  parts,  which  were  to 
be  led  in  four  columns  abreast  to  the  place  from  which  the  separate 
columns  would  proceed  to  their  respective  positions.  The  interior 
columns  were  composed  of  the  men  from  Virginia  and  from  Sulli' 
van  County,  Campbell  leading  his  men  in  the  right  column  and 
Shelby  his  men  in  the  left.  The  right  flank  column  was  made  up  of 
men  from  Surry,  the  Nolichucky,  and  Burke;  Major  Winston  being 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  followed  by  Colonel  Sevier.  The  detach' 
ment  commanded  by  Major  McDowell  was  joined  to  Sevier's  com' 
mand.  The  left  flank  column  was  composed  of  the  men  from  Wilkes 
and  those  who  joined  the  preceding  day  from  the  two  Carolinas 
under  Colonel  Williams.  Major  Chronicle  was  at  the  head  of  this 
column,  followed  by  Colonel  Cleveland.  The  senior  officer  who 
accompanied  the  Lincoln  County  men  into  action  was  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Hambright,  but  he  waived  his  right  to  command  in  favor 
of  Major  Chronicle.  The  right  and  left  flank  columns  were  about 
the  same  strength,  and  each  equaled  that  of  the  two  regiments 
constituting  the  interior  columns. 

1281 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUJiTAIH 

In  this  order  the  several  columns  proceeded  from  the  plateau 
into  the  bottom  of  the  ravine  north  of  the  mountain.  Here  the 
right  and  the  two  interior  columns  halted,  dismounted,  tied  their 
horses  to  trees  and  bushes,  and  left  a  small  group  of  men  in  charge. 
The  left  column  continued  its  march  around  the  east  point  of  the 
mountain,  thence  southwestwardly,  to  its  position. 

Shelby's  men  were  deployed  in  the  vicinity  of  the  highway, 
from  which  position  they  were  to  attack  the  eastern  extremity  of 
the  ridge.  Campbell  was  on  Shelby's  right,  along  the  bed  of  the 
stream.  These  two  regiments  were  first  in  position,  and  had  the 
most  difficult  terrain  on  their  front,  due  to  the  sharpness  of  the 
slope  and  the  height  of  the  crest.  Beyond  Campbell,  on  his  right, 
was  McDowell,  and  then  Sevier.  The  deployment  of  the  latter 
was  along  the  stream  line  leading  up  to  the  narrow  hogback  just 
southwest  of  the  highest  elevation  of  the  ridge. 

When  the  units  in  the  left  column  reached  their  positions  south 
of  the  mountain,  they  dismounted  and  formed  line,  with  Winston, 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  connecting  with  the  right  of  Sevier  at 
the  hogback.  On  the  right  of  Winston  was  Chronicle,  then  Clevc 
land,  with  Williams  between  Cleveland  and  Shelby.  All  of  the 
commanders  cautioned  their  men  to  hold  their  fire  until  near  the 
enemy,  and  to  reform  their  ranks,  if  broken,  and  renew  the  fight. 
Appeal  was  made  to  their  patriotism  and  love  of  liberty,  although 
this  was  not  necessary,  as  every  man  went  into  battle  resolved  to 
fight  as  long  as  life  lasted. 

Ferguson's  Provincials  and  militia  were  formed  on  the  summit 
of  the  ridge,  which  varied  in  width  from  30  to  60  yards.  His  camp 
and  wagon  train  were  established  here  also.  The  crest  was  com' 
paratively  level  within  the  narrow  confines  indicated,  and  free  from 
trees.  Rock  outcroppings  provided  a  limited  amount  of  cover  for 
firing  positions.  Pickets  had  been  placed  in  the  direction  of  approach 
of  the  enemy,  to  give  warning  of  his  presence. 

The  attack  started  at  3  o'clock,  with  the  driving  in  of  the  cover- 
ing forces.  The  center  of  the  patriot  army,  under  Campbell  and 

1291 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUKTAIH 

Shelby,  was  the  first  to  engage  the  enemy.  The  Virginia  and  Sulli' 
van  County  men  advanced  up  the  steep  slopes,  taking  cover  behind 
rocks  and  trees,  with  a  fair  field  of  fire,  as  the  underbrush  was  not 
thick.  Their  attack  was  sustained  for  about  15  minutes  while  the 
flank  groups  proceeded  to  their  several  positions,  when  the  fire 
became  general  around  the  entire  mountain.  The  groups  then  closed 
in,  and  Campbell's  and  Shelby's  men  almost  reached  the  enemy 
lines,  but  here  they  were  met  by  Ferguson's  Provincial  Corps,  and 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  driven  down  the  mountain.  Their  offi' 
cers  bravely  rallied  them,  however,  and  under  cover  of  rocks  and 
trees  the  enemy  fire  was  returned.  The  Provincials  now  in  turn 
fell  back  before  the  sure  marksmanship  of  the  mountain  men,  and 
were  pursued  to  the  top  of  the  crest,  where  a  second  time  they 
resorted  to  the  bayonet,  and  again  forced  the  retirement  of  Camp' 
bell's  and  Shelby's  men,  but  only  to  the  point  where,  from  behind 
cover,  they  had  time  to  reload  their  rifles,  and  by  their  deadly  fire 
stop  the  onrush  of  the  enemy  and  compel  their  return  once  more 
to  the  ridge  top. 

When  pressure  of  the  right  and  left  wings  began  to  be  felt  by 
Ferguson,  new  dispositions  had  to  be  made  of  his  forces  to  meet 
the  situation.  The  parts  of  the  encircling  band  composed  of  the 
men  of  McDowell  and  Sevier  on  the  north,  and  of  Williams,  Clevc 
land,  Chronicle,  and  Winston  to  the  south  of  the  mountain,  closed 
in  toward  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and  on  its  southwest  extremity  the 
enemy  was  cleared  from  the  summit,  and  forced  in  a  northeasterly 
direction  into  a  huddled  group. 

About  this  time  Campbell's  and  Shelby's  men  succeeded  in  gain' 
ing  the  portion  of  the  ridge  on  their  front,  driving  all  before  them, 
back  into  the  group  that  the  closing  of  the  wings  was  compressing. 
The  defenders  of  the  mountain  were  now  in  sore  straits.  The  losses 
among  the  Provincial  Corps  were  heavy.  These  troops  had  fought 
with  great  heroism,  but  their  numbers  were  too  few  to  win  alone. 
The  Tory  militia  endured  the  contest  as  long  as  was  to  be  expected 
of  them.  Ferguson's  survivors  were  surrounded  by  an  enemy 
fiercely  determined  to  fight  for  complete  victory. 

1301 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUHTAITi 

It  was  evident  that  nothing  could  be  done  to  better  the  situa- 
tion  and  snatch  victory  from  defeat,  and  Ferguson  determined  to 
cut  his  way  through  the  band  of  fire  and  escape.  He,  with  several 
of  his  officers,  made  this  desperate  move,  but  was  shot  from  his 
horse  and  killed  instantly.  Captain  De  Peyster,  the  second  in  com' 
mand,  bravely  continued  the  fight  for  a  brief  time,  but  the  confusion 
was  so  great,  and  his  compadt  group  of  followers  such  a  vulnerable 
target,  that  further  resistance  was  suicidal,  and  a  white  flag  was 
shown. 

It  was  some  time  before  the  firing  could  be  stopped.  Units  had 
become  disorganized  and  intermingled  during  the  fierce  conflict,  and 
all  firing  did  not  cease  at  the  time  De  Peyster  surrendered  his  com' 
mand.  Then,  too,  there  were  some  who  refused  quarter  to  many  of 
the  Tories  who  asked  for  it,  in  retaliation  for  the  treatment  which 
they  heard  had  been  accorded  Buford's  command  at  the  Waxhaw 
on  May  29.  To  the  cry,  "Buford's  play,"  many  of  the  wounded 
were  hurried  into  oblivion.  The  total  number  of  Tories  killed  and 
wounded  in  this  action  was  334,  and  of  this  number  206  were 
reported  killed. 

The  battle  lasted  an  hour  and  five  minutes.  The  report  of  this 
engagement,  prepared  by  Colonels  Campbell,  Shelby,  and  Cleve' 
land,  and  submitted  to  General  Gates  between  three  and  four  weeks 
after  the  battle,  stated  that  the  official  provision  returns  for  the  7th 
of  October,  found  in  camp,  gave  an  enemy  strength  of  1,125  men. 
The  losses  given  in  the  report  for  the  Provincial  Corps  were  19 
killed,  35  wounded,  68  prisoners;  total,  122.  The  Tory  losses  were 
206  killed,  128  wounded,  648  prisoners;  total,  982.  The  combined 
totals  give  a  strength  on  the  battle  field  at  the  time  of  the  action 
of  1,104,  as  no  one  escaped.  In  addition  to  Colonel  Ferguson,  the 
Provincial  Corps  had  one  captain  killed;  and  among  the  Tories, 
two  colonels  and  three  captains  lost  their  lives,  and  one  major  was 
wounded.  The  losses  in  the  patriot  army,  as  given  in  the  report, 
were  28  killed  and  62  wounded,  a  total  of  90.  The  Virginia  regi- 
ment suffered  the  heaviest  losses.  Campbell's  command  had  13 

1311 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

officers  killed  or  mortally  wounded.  The  Lincoln  County  men 
lost  their  leader,  Major  Chronicle,  and  Colonel  Williams  received 
wounds  from  which  he  died  the  following  day.  The  booty  captured 
included  17  baggage  wagons  and  1,200  stand  of  arms. 

A  defeat  so  overwhelming  as  that  suffered  by  Ferguson's  com' 
mand  is  rare  in  warfare.  His  position  on  Kings  Mountain  was 
selected  after  mature  deliberation.  The  top  of  the  mountain  was  just 
large  enough  to  serve  as  a  battle  ground  for  his  command  and  to 
provide  space  for  his  camp  and  wagon  train.  Water  was  near  and 
plentiful.  The  advance  of  the  attackers  would  be  impeded  by  the 
slopes  of  the  mountain.  When  attacked  he  could  expect  that  retreat 
would  be  rendered  hazardous  by  flanking  or  encircling  detach' 
ments,  a  condition  he  desired,  as  his  militia  would  be  put  to  the 
necessity  of  fighting  instead  of  fleeing.  A  better  position  on  which 
to  make  a  stand  and  fight  could  not  have  been  found. 

That  he  underestimated  the  valor  of  the  mountain  men  is  unques' 
tionable.  Their  reputed  superiority  in  numbers  did  not  deter  him 
from  offering  battle,  otherwise  he  would  have  continued  his  march 
on  the  7th  in  the  direction  of  Charlotte  Town.  But  had  he  known 
that  these  crusaders  from  the  mountains  would  stand  and  fight 
with  a  fierceness  heretofore  unexperienced  in  his  southern  cam' 
paign,  he  would  have  been  more  discreet  and  less  valorous.  His 
epitaph,  written  by  his  brother  officers  and  published  in  the  New 
York  Gazette  of  February  14, 1781,  rings  with  affectionate  praise 
and  admiration  for  his  many  admirable  qualities  as  a  man  and  soldier. 

The  leaders  of  the  patriots,  and  the  men  whom  they  commanded, 
were  honored  with  the  thanks  of  their  several  legislatures;  and 
the  thanks  of  Congress  were  given  in  a  resolution  of  the  13th  of 
November,  as  follows: 

Resolved,  That  Congress  entertain  a  high  sense  of  the  spirited  and  military 
conduct  of  Colonel  Campbell,  and  the  officers  and  privates  of  the  militia  under 
his  command,  displayed  in  action  of  the  7  of  October,  in  which  a  compleat  victory 
was  obtained  over  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy,  advantageously  posted  on 
King's  Mountain,  in  the  state  of  North  Carolina;  and  that  this  resolution  be 
published  by  the  commanding  officer  of  the  southern  army,  in  general  orders. 

1321 


Part  III 


CORNWALLIS  ON  THE  DEFENSIVE  ~  INACTIVITY 
IN  THE  NORTH™ CONCLUSIONS 

SHE  day  following  the  battle  the  victors  and 
their  prisoners  withdrew  in  the  direction  of 

Tg&g2  the  mountains.  On  the  13th  of  October  they 
/Ijvyj  reached  BickerstafPs  plantation,  about  15  miles 
£$3^  northeast,  of  Gilbert  Town.  It  was  here  that  a 
number  of  the  prisoners  were  tried  by  a  court 
of  officers,  and  30  found  guilty  of  "breaking 
open  houses,  killing  the  men,  and  turning  the  women  and  children 
out  of  doors  and  burning  the  houses."  On  the  14th  nine  of  the 
convicted  men  were  hanged. 

Following  this  event  the  march  was  resumed  in  the  direction  of 
Virginia,  in  consequence  of  instructions  sent  by  Gates  on  the  12th 
that  the  prisoners  were  to  be  escorted  under  proper  guard  to  Fin' 
castle  Court  House,  Va.  By  the  time  the  Catawba  was  reached,  like 
all  partisan  groups,  these  men  thought  their  mission  being  accom- 
plished  they  could  return  to  their  homes,  and  at  this  time  there 
were  no  more  troops  than  prisoners. 

On  reaching  Bethabara  a  halt  was  made,  and  on  the  26th  Camp- 
bell turned  the  command  over  to  Cleveland,  and  he  and  Shelby 
repaired  to  Gates's  headquarters  in  Hillsborough  to  arrange  for  the 
disposition  of  the  prisoners.  The  official  report  of  the  battle  was 
prepared  some  time  subsequent  to  the  departure  from  the  com- 
mand of  Sevier  and  Lacey  at  Quaker  Meadows,  and  was  delivered 
to  General  Gates  by  Colonel  Campbell  October  31,  or  the  day 
following. 

Rumors  of  the  disaster  which  Ferguson's  army  suffered  probably 
reached  the  patriots  in  and  around  Charlotte  Town  late  the  follow- 
ing day  or  morning  of  the  9th.  By  the  10th  Cornwallis's  headquar- 

I33J 


THE  BATTLE    OF    KIKCS    MOUKTAIH 

ters  had  received  sufficient  intelligence  to  cause  great  fear  that  a 
disaster  of  some  nature  had  occurred,  and  Tarleton's  command  was 
ordered  to  proceed  immediately  to  reinforce  Ferguson  wherever  he 
could  be  found,  "and  to  draw  his  corps  to  the  Catawba,  if  after  the 
junction,  advantage  could  not  be  obtained  over  the  mountaineers; 
or,  upon  the  certainty  of  his  defeat,  at  all  events  to  oppose  the 
entrance  of  the  victorious  Americans  into  South  Carolina."  Tarle' 
ton  proceeded  to  the  Catawba,  where  he  received  certain  informa' 
tion  of  the  melancholy  fate  of  Ferguson.  Upon  crossing  this  river, 
to  "give  protection  to  the  fugitives,  and  to  attend  the  operations  of 
the  enemy,"  he  realized  the  complete  disaster  to  the  royal  cause  in 
the  surrounding  country.  In  his  book  description  of  the  campaign 
of  1780  and  1781 ,  published  in  1787,  he  said : 

The  destruction  of  Ferguson  and  his  corps  marked  the  period  and  the  extent 
of  the  first  expedition  into  North  Carolina.  Added  to  the  depression  and  fear  it 
communicated  to  the  loyalists  upon  the  borders,  and  to  the  southward,  the  effect 
of  such  an  important  event  was  sensibly  felt  by  Earl  Comwallis  at  Charlotte 
town.  The  weakness  of  his  army,  the  extent  and  poverty  of  North  Carolina,  the 
want  of  knowledge  of  his  enemy's  designs,  and  the  total  ruin  of  his  militia, 
presented  a  gloomy  prospect  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaign.  A  farther 
progress  by  the  route  which  he  had  undertaken  could  not  possibly  remove,  but 
would  undoubtedly  encrease  his  difficulties;  he  therefore  formed  a  sudden  deter' 
mination  to  quit  Charlotte  town,  and  pass  the  Catawba  river.  The  army  was 
ordered  to  move,  and  expresses  were  dispatched  to  recal  Lieutenant-colonel 
Tarleton. 

Cornwallis,s  army  left  Charlotte  Town  on  October  14,  marching 
southwest  to  the  Catawba,  and  from  thence  in  a  direction  to  cover 
both  Camden  and  Ninety  Six.  Following  the  defeat  of  Ferguson, 
Cruger  sent  information  to  Cornwallis  from  Ninety  Six  that  the 
whole  district  had  determined  to  submit  as  soon  as  those  in  revolt 
against  the  King  should  enter  it,  and  Cornwallis  decided  that  in 
withdrawing  it  should  be  in  a  direction  that  would  permit  of  con' 
tact  with  both  Camden  and  Ninety  Six.  On  the  29th  of  October 
Lord  Rawdon,  who  was  in  temporary  command  of  the  British  Army 
owing  to  the  illness  of  Cornwallis,  wrote  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton: 

I34J 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

Lord  Cornwallis  foresees  all  the  difficulties  of  a  defensive  war,  yet  his  lord' 
ship  thinks  they  can  not  be  weighed  against  the  dangers  which  must  have 
attended  an  obstinate  adherence  to  his  former  plan. 

Withdrawal  from  North  Carolina  was  continued  for  more  than 
60  miles  from  Charlotte  Town,  before  the  army  halted  and  went 
into  camp  at  Wynnesborough. 

On  the  3d  of  December  Cornwallis,  who  had  recovered  from  his 
illness,  wrote  to  the  commander  in  chief  from  Wynnesborough  of 
the  various  causes  which  prevented  his  penetration  into  North 
Carolina.  Regarding  Ferguson's  mission  toward  the  mountains  he 
said: 

The  event  proved  unfortunate,  without  any  fault  of  Major  Ferguson's.  A 
numerous  and  unexpected  enemy  came  from  the  mountains;  as  they  had  good 
horses  their  movements  were  rapid. 

Regarding  his  position  at  Wynnesborough,  he  advised  that  it 
was  well  situated  to  protedt  the  greatest  part  of  the  frontier,  and  to 
assist  Camden  and  Ninety  Six.  He  determined  to  remain  at  this 
place  until  he  learned  of  the  intentions  of  General  Leslie's  com' 
mand,  on  which  his  plan  for  the  winter  was  to  depend;  meanwhile 
using  every  possible  means  of  putting  the  Province  into  a  state  of 
defense,  which  he  considered  necessary,  whether  his  future  cam' 
paign  was  offensive  or  defensive.  The  extent  of  his  disappointment 
and  discouragement  over  conditions  in  the  southern  district  are 
expressed  in  a  sentence  near  the  close  of  the  above'mentioned  letter, 
which  reads : 

After  everything  that  has  happened  I  will  not  presume  to  make  your  excellency 
any  sanguine  promises. 

Campaigning  in  the  South  during  1780  consisted  almost  entirely 
of  partisan  warfare,  wherein  detachments  of  the  Army,  militia, 
and  irregular  groups  fought  over  wide  areas.  The  main  armies 
were  engaged  but  twice — at  Charleston  and  Camden — both  Brit' 
ish  victories.  The  territory  involved,  from  Charlotte  Town  south, 
constituted  a  large  portion  of  the  colonial  area,  but  the  more  impor' 
tant  part,  from  the  standpoint  of  wealth  and  density  of  population, 

I35J 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUHTAIH 

was  in  the  north.  The  seat  of  government  was  at  Philadelphia; 
Washington's  headquarters  during  the  first  of  the  year  at  Morris' 
town;  and  the  commercial  center  in  New  York,  held,  at  the  time,  by 
the  British.  What  concern  was  felt  by  Washington  and  Congress 
over  conditions  in  the  Carolinas  was  largely  due  to  the  uncer' 
tainty  as  to  the  strategy  which  Clinton  would  use  in  the  North. 
The  year  1780,  like  those  which  had  gone  before,  brought  to 
Washington  many  problems  of  vital  import  to  the  American  cause. 
The  calm,  dispassionate  manner  in  which  he  planned  for  the  Army 
and  advised  with  Congress  indicates  a  grandeur  of  character  and  a 
capacity  for  work  too  little  understood.  His  faith  in  the  justice  of 
the  cause  and  its  ultimate  success  was  unbounded,  despite  the  fad; 
that  at  times  his  optimism  faltered  and  he  felt  that  "we  are  totter' 
ing  on  the  brink  of  a  precipice.11  But  this  temporary  despair  is 
explained  by  his  overwhelming  surprise  over  the  treason  of  Arnold. 
Matters  of  more  casual  concern,  such  as  difficulties  in  connection 
with  the  draft,  depreciated  currency,  lack  of  supplies,  intermittently 
starving  Army,  general  disaffection  amongst  the  troops;  all  these 
had  been  his  problems  for  a  long  time;  they  had  been  solved  some' 
how  or  other,  and  he  had  faith  in  their  solution  for  the  future.  He 
wrote  to  Baron  von  Steuben  on  April  2: 

My  sentiments  concerning  public  affairs  correspond  too  much  with  yours. 
The  prospect,  my  dear  Baron,  is  gloomy,  and  the  storm  threatens.  But  I  hope  we 
shall  extricate  ourselves,  and  bring  everything  to  a  prosperous  issue.  I  have  been 
so  inured  to  difficulties  in  the  course  of  this  contest,  that  I  have  learned  to  look 
upon  them  with  more  tranquillity  than  formerly. 

England  was  complete  mistress  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Her 
fleet  held  the  harbors  of  Halifax,  Penobscot,  New  York,  Charleston, 
and  Savannah,  and  that  the  Colonies,  as  a  consequence,  had  not 
suffered  more  than  they  had,  Washington  ascribed  to  the  "feeble 
and  injudicious  manner  in  which  the  enemy  have  applied  the  means 
in  their  hands  during  this  war."  He  realized  that  a  fleet  was  essen- 
tial to  the  success  of  the  American  cause,  and  only  from  France 
could  this  succor  come.  La  Fayette  had  returned  to  Europe  the  pre 

1361 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

ceding  year  to  use  his  tremendous  enthusiasm  for  the  American 
cause  as  a  lever  to  pry  from  the  King  and  his  ministers  a  fleet  and  an 
army  that  would  make  of  France  an  effective  ally  of  America.  His 
return  to  the  Colonies  on  the  27th  of  April,  1780,  with  the  joyous 
tidings  that  a  fleet  and  army  were  soon  to  follow,  heartened 
Washington  and  Congress  beyond  measure. 

The  British  Army  in  the  North  was  quiet  during  the  first  half 
of  1780,  due  to  the  detachment  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  fleet 
and  army  for  operations  in  the  South.  The  American  Army  was 
quiet,  as  tidings  from  France  were  awaited,  and  when  the  French 
fleet  and  army  finally  did  arrive,  Washington  abandoned  his  winter 
quarters  early  in  June  and  prepared  for  operations  to  secure  the 
reduction  of  the  city  and  garrison  of  New  York.  He  estimated  that 
he  would  have  a  force  of  from  30,000  to  40,000  men,  after  the 
militia  joined. 

However,  with  the  blockade  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  port  of 
Rhode  Island,  the  projected  campaign  to  conquer  New  York  had 
to  be  abandoned,  and  a  season  of  comparative  inactivity  on  the  part 
of  his  army  drew  to  a  close  in  October.  The  following  month 
arrangements  were  made  to  go  into  winter  quarters  again. 

With  both  Congress  and  Washington,  their  principal  concern 
was  the  main  army  under  his  command.  What  occurred  south  of  the 
Chesapeake  were  collateral  issues  to  which  only  a  limited  amount 
of  thought,  energy,  and  assistance  could  be  given.  While  Charles' 
ton  was  undergoing  its  siege,  Washington  wrote  to  Philip  Schuyler, 
who  was  in  Congress: 

What  to  do  for  the  Southern  States,  without  involving  consequences  equally 
alarming  in  this  quarter,  I  know  not. 

Upon  his  recommendation,  Congress  detached  the  Maryland 
division  to  reinforce  the  South,  and  it  fought  with  great  credit  at 
Camden.  Later  Congress  added  Delaware  and  Maryland  to  the 
Southern  Department.  It  was  felt  in  the  North  that  Charleston 
would  probably  fall,  in  which  case,  Washington  wrote  on  April  15, 
"there  is  much  reason  to  believe  the  Southern  States  will  become 
the  principal  theater  of  war." 

P71 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIH 

After  the  defeat  at  Camden,  Washington  wrote  to  Count  de 
Rochambeau  on  the  8th  of  September  that  "this  event  must  have 
the  worst  effect  upon  the  affairs  of  the  Southern  States.  Nor  is  it 
easy  to  say  how  far  its  influence  may  extend."  But  it  was  expected 
that  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  Carolinas  were  vitally  concerned  in 
independence,  they  would  rise  in  sufficient  numbers  to  acquire  it, 
at  least  within  their  own  boundaries,  and  affairs  in  the  North  still 
continued  to  monopolize  the  attention  of  both  Congress  and  Wash' 
ington.  However,  there  was  sufficient  concern  to  prompt  action 
which  resulted  in  sending  to  the  Southern  Department  late  in  the 
year  a  competent  commander,  General  Nathanael  Greene.  Receipt 
of  the  news  as  to  how  the  mountain  men  overcame  Ferguson  thrilled 
the  entire  country,  and  Congress  showed  its  appreciation  of  this 
magnificent  feat  in  the  manner  already  referred  to,  but  beyond  this 
it  was  but  an  incident  of  the  southern  campaign.  Following  Cam' 
den,  Arnold's  treason,  and  the  inactive  campaign  of  his  army,  on 
the  day  after  Washington  wrote  that  "we  are  tottering  on  the  brink 
of  a  precipice,"  he  said  in  a  letter  to  General  Cadwalader,  "our 
case  is  not  desperate,  if  virtue  exists  in  the  people,  and  there  is 
wisdom  among  our  rulers." 

In  considering  the  effect  of  the  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain  upon 
the  situation  in  the  South,  it  was  only  this  epic  tragedy  to  FergU' 
son's  army  that  halted  Cornwallis  in  his  subjugation  of  North 
Carolina.  Without  this,  or  a  similar  calamity,  he  would  have 
reached  the  northern  borders  of  the  Province  in  December,  and 
with  the  Chesapeake  occupied  by  the  British  fleet,  Virginia  would 
have  suffered  the  same  fate.  What  the  outcome  of  such  a  situation 
in  the  winter  of  1780-81  would  have  been  is  problematic.  In  a  letter 
to  Count  de  Vergennes  from  M.  de  la  Luzerne,  the  latter  declared 
that  the  intention  of  the  British  was  to  sever  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia  from  the  North.  After  the  fall  of  Charleston,  a  gazette 
was  published  in  that  town  in  which  the  conquerors  circulated 
insinuations  that  the  Northern  States  had  abandoned  the  South, 
and  were  about  to  make  arrangements  with  England  which  would 
exclude  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia.  The  letter  adds: 

1381 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KITiGS    MOUNTAIN 

These  attempts  had  an  effect.  The  Members  of  Congress  are  divided  as  to 
their  interests  and  objects.  Some  are  for  using  all  efforts  for  rescuing  the  South. 
Others  think  the  people  there  have  shown  too  little  zeal  and  activity  in  the  cause, 
and  that  it  is  not  expedient  to  put  in  jeopardy  the  safety  of  the  North  by  rendering 
extraordinary  aid  to  people  who  are  so  indifferent  about  their  own  independence. 
*  *  *  It  is  possible  that  the  British  will  make  a  proposition  to  the  10  North- 
ern States  tending  to  assure  their  independence;  and  their  scheme  will  be  to  form 
into  a  new  government  the  two  Carolinas,  Georgia,  east  Florida,  and  the  Bahama 
Islands,  which  together  would  make  a  respectable  possession. 

That  there  was  some  foundation  for  the  impressions  above  com' 
municated  is  confirmed  in  a  letter  from  Mr.  Duane,  in  Congress,  to 
General  Schuyler,  written  the  21sT:  of  May.  Said  he: 

That  the  reinforcements  ordered  to  the  southward  should  be  halted  is  obvious 
for  the  reasons  you  assign.  But  do  you  expect  such  a  proposition  from  a  northern 
Member,  deeply  interested  in  Strengthening  the  main  army?  It  is  a  question  of 
the  utmost  delicacy  and  even  danger;  for,  however  groundlessly,  an  opinion  has 
been  propagated,  that  Congress  means  to  sacrifice  the  two  southernmost  States, 
and  it  has  been  productive  of  the  greatest  animosity  and  discontent.  We  have 
privately  stated  the  subject  to  some  of  the  southern  gentlemen,  who,  though  I 
believe  convinced  of  the  propriety  of  the  measure,  did  not  choose,  after  great 
deliberation,  to  have  it  adopted,  much  less  to  propose  it.  There  is  but  one  person 
from  whom  it  can  originate  with  any  prospect  of  success.  If  we  had  undertaken 
it,  nothing  would  have  resulted  but  disappointment  and  the  loss  of  personal 
confidence. 

The  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain  was  the  outstanding  victory  of 
the  Americans  in  1780.  Following  it,  Cornwallis  was  compelled  to 
abandon  North  Carolina,  and  for  a  time  assume  the  defensive.  It 
put  an  end  to  the  possibility  of  an  eventual  peace  with  England 
under  such  terms  as  might  have  resulted  in  the  retention  of  the 
southern  Provinces  under  British  rule.  It  is  an  exemplification  of 
American  aspirations  for  self'government  and  a  display  of  romantic 
hardihood  and  bravery  well  worthy  the  careful  study  of  American 
youth. 


K39J 


140! 


Part  IV 


THE  BATTLE  GROUND  OF  KINGS  MOUNTAIN 
IN  SOUTH  CAROLINA 

jHERE  never  has  been  any  uncertainty  as  to 
the  actual  location  of  the  ground  on  which 

TS&p^  the  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain  was  fought,  but 
/st^n  due  to  the  defects  and  limitations  in  early 
§?f§j)  maps,  the  battle  has  frequently  been  described 
as  occurring  in  North  Carolina.  Many  of  the 
early  maps  show  "King  Mountain"  north  of 
the  boundary  line,  with  none  of  the  mountain  symbols  extending 
into  South  Carolina.  As  a  result  the  battle  was  accredited  to  North 
Carolina. 

In  1772  a  portion  of  the  boundary  between  the  two  Carolinas 
was  surveyed  from  the  Catawba  River  westwardly.  The  origin  of 
this  portion  of  the  boundary  was  the  center  of  the  junction  of  the 
Catawba  and  the  South  Fork  of  the  Catawba.  From  this  junction 
the  line  was  to  run  due  west  to  the  mountains  and  there  connect 
with  the  boundary  of  the  Cherokee  Nation. 

The  Price  and  Strother  map,  engraved  in  1808,  which  purports 
to  be  "The  First  Actual  Survey  of  the  State  of  North  Carolina," 
shows  the  1772  line  crossing  the  Broad  River  1^4  miles  south  of  the 
east  and  west  line  through  the  junction  of  the  Broad  and  the  First 
Broad.  This  corresponds  with  the  distance  on  the  Gaffhey  quad' 
rangle  of  the  United  States  Geological  Survey.  By  other  checks  of 
the  1772  line  where  it  crosses  streams,  with  the  United  States 
Geological  Survey  of  the  line,  it  is  evident  that  both  lines  are  one 
and  the  same. 

On  the  Price  and  Strother  map,  and  on  all  other  maps  subsequent 
to  1772  for  many  years,  the  boundary  line  from  the  junction  of  the 
branches  of  the  Catawba  is  shown  as  running  due  west.  It  was 


141 1 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIKGS    MOUHTAITi 

later  discovered  that  due  to  magnetic  errors  the  line  was  run  north 
of  west.  The  United  States  Geological  Survey  maps  show  that  this 
deviation  is  about  2}4°.  The  1772  line  has  been  resurveyed  and 
confirmed,  but  never  has  it  been  changed  between  the  Catawba 
and  the  mountains,  68  miles  west.  The  latitude  of  the  1772  line 
near  its  initial  point  is  35°  09'  01.5".  An  inspection  of  the  Kings 
Mountain  quadrangle  will  show  that  the  battle  ground  is  much  far' 
ther  south,  hence  had  the  line  been  run  due  west,  as  was  intended, 
the  battle  ground  would  nevertheless  He  within  the  borders  of 
South  Carolina. 


C42J 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUJ^TAIH 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


SOURCE  MATERIAL  ANALYZED 

Sparks,  1835:  The  Writings  of  George  Washington. 

Ford,  1891:  The  Writings  of  George  Washington. 

1780-81 :  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress. 

Sparks,  1853:  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution.  Letters  to  Washington. 

Stevens,  1888:  Clinton-Cornwallis  Controversy  Growing  out  of  the  Campaign  in  Virginia.  A 
reprint  of  six  pamphlets,  with  other  matter  added. 

Cornwaixis,  1783 :  An  answer  by  Cornwallis  to  certain  parts  of  Narrative  by  Clinton. 

Clinton,  1783 :  Observations  by  Clinton  on  certain  parts  of  Cornwallis's  Answer. 

Ross,  1859:  Correspondence  of  Cornwallis. 

Tarleton,  1787:  History  of  the  Campaign  of  1780  and  1781,  in  the  Southern  Provinces  of  North 
America. 

Mackenzie,  1787:  Strictures  on  Tarleton's  History. 

Almon,  1780-81:  The  Remembrancer. 

Houghed,  1867:  The  Siege  of  Charleston  by  the  British  Fleet  and  Army. 

Draper,  1881 :  King's  Mountain  and  its  Heroes.  The  appendix  publishes  the  following  source 
material:  Allaire's  Diary;  letters  from  officers  of  the  Provincial  Corps;  letter,  Williams  to  Gates; 
letter,  Davidson  to  Sumner;  letter,  Gates  to  Jefferson;  letter,  Shelby  to  Shelby;  letter,  Shelby  to 
Arthur  Campbell;  letter,  Campbell  to  Campbell;  letter,  Shelby  to  Sevier;  official  report;  Wash- 
ington's general  order;  Campbell's  general  orders;  vote  of  thanks,  Virginia  Legislature;  vote  of 
thanks,  Virginia  Senate;  Diary  of  Ensign  Robert  Campbell;  account  of  battle  by  Ensign  Robert 
Campbell;  Shelby's  statements  to  Hardin  in  1815-1819;  Shelby's  1823  statement. 

Vance,  narrative:  Pamphlets  on  the  Revolutionary  War. 

Maps:  United  States  Geological  Survey — Kings  Mountain  quadrangle;  Gaffney  quadrangle;  Roan 
Mountain  quadrangle;  Mount  Mitchell  quadrangle;  Morganton  quadrangle;  State  of  Tennessee; 
State  of  North  Carolina;  State  of  South  Carolina.  Price  and  Strother — North  Carolina,  1808. 
Mills  Atlas,  1825. 

BOOKS  AND  PAMPHLETS  READ 

Draper,  1881:  Kings  Mountain  and  Its  Heroes.  Collection  of  material  for  this  history  covered  a 

period  of  40  years.  The  book  contains  much  source  material  of  varying  worth. 
Losslng,  1860:  Pictorial  Field  Book  of  the  Revolution. 
Carrington,  1876:  Battles  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Landrum,  1897:  Colonial  and  Revolutionary  History  of  Upper  South  Carolina. 
Ramsay,  1789:  The  History  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Ramsay,  1809:  The  History  of  South  Carolina. 
Ramsey,  1853:  Annals  of  Tennessee. 

Stedman,  1794:  The  History  of  the  Origin,  Progress,  and  Termination  of  the  American  War. 
Simms,  1860:  The  History  of  South  Carolina. 
Wilkin,  1914:  Some  British  Soldiers  in  America. 


1431 


THE    BATTLE    OF    KIHGS    MOUHTAIJi 

Warren,  1805:  History  of  the  Rise,  Progress,  and  Termination  of  the  American  Revolution. 

Hunter,  1877:  Sketches  of  Western  North  Carolina. 

Wheeler,  1861 :  History  of  North  Carolina. 

Johnson,  1822:  Sketches  of  the  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Nathanael  Greene. 

Roosevelt,  1889:  The  Winning  of  the  West. 

Graham,  1913:  Address  by  Major  Graham  on  General  Davidson,  in  North  Carolina  Booklet. 

Boyd,  1909:  The  Battle  of  Kings  Mountain,  in  North  Carolina  Booklet. 

Channtng,  188S:  The  War  in  the  Southern  Department. 

Graham,  1904:  General  Joseph  Graham  and  His  Papers  on  North  Carolina  Revolutionary  History. 

De  Peyster,  1880:  The  Affair  of  King's  Mountain. 

De  Peyster,  1881 :  The  Battle  or  Affair  of  King's  Mountain. 

Greene,  1871 :  The  Life  of  Nathanael  Greene. 

McCrady,  1901 :  The  History  of  South  Carolina  in  the  Revolution. 

Sohenck,  1889:  North  Carolina,  1780-81. 

Lee,  1869:  Memoirs  of  the  War  in  the  Southern  Department  of  the  United  States  by  Lieut.  CoL 

Henry  Lee. 
Johnson,  1822:  Sketches  of  the  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Nathanael  Greene. 
Sablne,  1864:  Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution. 


[44J 


LZ   COL.  H.L.  LANDERS,  F.A. 
HISTORICAL    SECTION,  ARMY  WAR  COLUCC 


Contour   intervals- 10  feet. 

?  ?  1  S6TS9  looo-dj. 

A.- Old  monument. 
B.-New  monument. 
C- Ferguson  killed  here. 
Dl-  Ferguson's  qrave. 
E.-  Monument. 

Battle,  of  Kings  Mountain 

OCTOBER   7,  17  80 

Sketch  made    in   April    I9Z5 
by  Lt.CoI.  H. L. Landers,  F.A. 


\ 


108368°— 28.      (Face  p.  44.)     No.  2 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  COWPENS 
SOUTH  CAROLINA 

January  17,  1781 


f46! 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  COWPENS 
Part  I 


BRITISH  PLANS 
TARLETON  SENT  AFTER  MORGAN 

>HE  Battle  of  the  Cowpens  was  the  second 
serious  disaster  which  occurred  to  the  Brit' 

T|ssj|j  ish  Army,  operating  in  the  Southern  States, 
/l^g  during  the  1780-81  campaign.  Following  the 
^^  capitulation  of  Charleston  on  May  12, 1780, 
all  of  South  Carolina  was  in  a  condition  of 
subjugation  within  a  few  months,  and  in  Sep' 
tember  British  headquarters  were  moved  to  Charlotte  Town,  N.  C. 
Prior  to  this  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ferguson  had  been  detached,  with 
a  small  force  of  Provincials,  to  organise  the  militia  and  operate  on 
CornwalUVs  flank.  On  the  7th  of  October  his  entire  command  was 
lost  at  Kings  Mountain.  Following  this  disaster  the  British  field 
army  was  withdrawn  more  than  60  miles  to  Wynnesborough,  and 
there  remained  on  the  defensive  while  awaiting  information  relative 
to  the  rehabilitation  of  Gates's  army,  now  commanded  by  Greene; 
and  in  coordinating  plans  with  the  commander  in  chief,  General 
Clinton,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  use  of  the  troops  under 
General  Leslie,  which  were  sent  from  New  York  to  Virginia. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Tarleton,  the  only  officer  remaining  after 
Ferguson's  death  used  by  Cornwallis  for  the  command  of  roving 
troops,  was  sent  into  the  district  north  of  Ninety  Six  to  oppose 
General  Morgan,  and  somewhat  later  Cornwallis  resumed  his  march 
northward.  Tarleton  and  Morgan  met  at  the  Cowpens,  on  the  17th 
of  January,  and  in  a  battle  noted  for  the  unusual  tactics  adopted  by 
the  Americans,  the  British  were  defeated,  with  heavy  losses,  by 
a  force  inferior  in  numbers,  a  considerable  portion  of  which  was 
militia. 

1471 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

The  relation  of  the  Cowpens  to  the  southern  campaign  in  1780-81 
can  be  understood  only  through  a  knowledge  of  the  purposes  of  the 
two  army  commanders,  Greene  and  Cornwallis,  during  the  period 
following  Kings  Mountain.  After  General  Clinton's  departure  from 
Charleston  for  New  York  on  June  5,  1780,  he  conducted  corre' 
spondence  with  Cornwallis  relative  to  operations  contemplated  in 
the  Chesapeake.  In  October  General  Leslie  was  given  command  of 
about  2,000  regulars,  and  sailed  from  New  York  to  establish  posts 
on  the  western  tributaries  of  the  Chesapeake,  near  its  mouth.  The 
letter  of  instructions  from  Clinton,  given  him  before  his  departure, 
directed  him  to  proceed  to  those  waters  and  make  a  diversion  in 
favor  of  Cornwallis,  who,  it  was  expected,  would  be,  at  the  time 
of  his  arrival,  in  central  and  western  North  Carolina.  The  instruc 
tions  suggested  that  he  proceed  up  the  James  River  and  destroy 
enemy  magazines  at  Petersburg,  Richmond,  and  elsewhere,  and 
finally  establish  a  post  on  the  Eksabeth  River  at  Portsmouth,  but 
that  under  any  conditions  he  was  to  communicate  as  soon  as  possible 
with  Cornwallis  and  act  under  his  orders. 

A  copy  of  the  instructions  under  which  Leslie  was  to  act  was 
received  by  Cornwallis  about  the  24th  of  October,  at  which  time 
he  was  withdrawing  from  Charlotte  Town,  and  the  possibility  of 
carrying  out  at  this  time  any  plan  of  joint  action  in  Virginia  was 
very  remote.  Lord  Rawdon,  who  commanded,  due  to  the  illness  of 
Cornwallis,  immediately  dispatched  a  letter  to  Leslie,  advising  him 
of  the  defeat  of  Ferguson,  with  its  consequent  augmentation  of 
defection  in  both  the  Carolinas,  and  of  the  necessity  of  the  British 
Army  remaining  within  supporting  distance  of  Ninety  Six  and  Cam' 
den  until  a  more  favorable  moment  arrived  for  the  resumption  of 
the  offensive.  From  the  circumstances  related  in  his  letter,  Lord 
Rawdon  expressed  the  fear  that  the  two  armies  were  too  far  apart 
to  render  Leslie's  cooperation  very  effectual. 

Although  the  British  commander  in  chief  had  signified  to  Corn' 
wallis  that  he  was  at  liberty  to  give  Leslie  any  direction  for  further 
cooperation  which  might  appear  to  him  expedient,  Cornwallis  was 

I48J 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

loath  at  this  time  to  instruct  the  latter  to  bring  his  troops  to  South 
Carolina.  He  feared  that  should  he  withdraw  this  force  from  the 
Chesapeake,  he  might  interfere  with  other  purposes,  unknown  to 
him,  to  which  Clinton  had  destined  these  troops.  Rawdon  there 
fore  informed  Leslie  in  October  that  "Lord  Cornwallis  thinks  him- 
self obliged  to  leave  you  at  liberty  to  pursue  whatsoever  measures 
may  appear  to  your  judgment  best  for  his  majesty's  service  and 
most  consonant  with  the  wishes  of  the  commander  in  chief."  In 
conclusion  Rawdon  informed  Leslie  that  should  his  knowledge  of 
Clinton's  desires  prompt  him  to  make  a  trial  upon  North  Carolina, 
a  movement  up  Cape  Fear  River  to  Cross  Creek  was  the  most 
likely,  at  this  time,  to  prove  effectual.  The  general  situation  in  the 
South  was  similarly  described  by  Rawdon  in  a  letter  to  Clinton  of 
the  29th  of  October,  wherein  was  stated  the  intention  of  not  defi' 
nitely  ordering  Leslie  to  the  Cape  Fear,  as  Clinton  might  have  other 
plans  with  which  such  a  move  would  interfere. 

When  Leslie  learned  of  General  Cornwallis's  desire  that  he  quit 
the  Chesapeake  and  move  up  the  Cape  Fear  to  Cross  Creek,  know 
ing  that  Clinton  had  no  ulterior  purpose  in  keeping  him  in  Virginia, 
he  immediately  planned  to  make  this  change  and  sent  dispatches 
to  Clinton  on  the  7th  of  November  informing  him  of  the  new 
arrangement.  This  met  with  the  entire  approval  of  the  commander 
in  chief.  A  second  letter  from  Lord  Rawdon,  written  on  the  31st 
of  October,  wherein  he  reiterated  in  a  more  urgent  manner  the 
wishes  of  Cornwallis  in  the  matter,  was  probably  the  deciding 
factor  in  prompting  compliance  by  Leslie. 

Cornwallis  established  his  camp  at  Wynnesborough  in  Novem- 
ber.  It  was  evident  from  the  correspondence  conducted  with  Leslie 
that  he  could  make  no  move  until  he  knew  where  the  latter  would 
establish  himself,  as  his  plans  for  the  winter  would  depend  upon 
this  knowledge.  The  success  of  the  Americans  at  Kings  Mountain 
had  done  much  to  overcome  the  depression  in  the  South,  following 
the  defeat  at  Camden,  and  partisan  forces  were  active  on  both  flanks 
of  the  British  Army.  Colonel  Marion  operated  between  the  Santee 

1491 


THE  BATTLE  OF    THE    COWPEHS 

and  Peedee,  and  from  this  locality  threatened  communications  and 
supplies  for  the  post  at  Camden,  and  the  army  at  Wynnesborough. 
Sumter  and  his  subordinate  leaders  were  active  west  of  the  Broad, 
threatening  Ninety  Six.  Furthermore,  the  British  had  intelligence 
that  General  Morgan,  with  Washington's  cavalry  and  a  body  of 
Continental  infantry,  was  advancing  toward  Lynches  Creek,  with 
Camden  as  their  objective. 

Early  in  November  Tarleton  had  been  sent  east  of  the  Wateree, 
and  on  his  arrival  at  Camden,  finding  no  reason  to  expect  an  attack 
upon  that  place  by  General  Morgan,  proceeded  down  the  east  bank 
of  the  river  against  Marion.  The  two  forces  met  on  the  10th,  but 
Marion,  realising  he  was  outnumbered,  retreated.  During  the  pur' 
suit  an  express  arrived  from  General  Cornwallis,  sent  from  Wynnes' 
borough  the  preceding  day,  directing  Tarleton  to  lose  no  time  in 
returning,  as  Cornwallis  was  "under  the  greatest  anxiety  for  Ninety 
Six."  The  circumstance  which  occasioned  this  unexpected  order 
was  the  predicament  into  which  Major  Wemyss,  at  the  head  of  40 
of  Tarleton's  dragoons,  and  the  mounted  Sixty'third,  had  gotten. 
He  was  operating  along  the  Broad,  and  learning  that  Sumter  with 
about  300  men  was  near  by,  undertook  to  surprise  him  by  a 
night  attack.  The  British  entered  Sumter's  camp  by  surprise,  but 
instead  of  dismounting  and  securing  the  enemy  arms,  they  remained 
mounted.  Sumter's  men  recovered  from  their  surprise,  got  their 
arms,  engaged  the  enemy,  wounded  Wemyss,  and  as  the  second  in 
command  did  not  know  his  plans,  the  British  withdrew. 

Cornwallis's  letter  of  recall  to  Tarleton  written  on  the  9th  was 
followed  by  another  on  the  10th,  and  a  third  on  the  11th  of  Novem- 
ber, so  urgent  was  he  that  Tarleton  appear  in  the  territory  of  the 
Broad  to  retrieve  the  situation,  and  fearful  that  the  other  letters 
might  not  have  gotten  through.  In  the  letter  of  the  11th  he  said: 

I  wish  you  would  get  three  legions,  and  divide  yourself  into  three  parts.  We 
can  do  no  good  without  you.  I  trust  to  your  coming  immediately,  unless  you  see 
something  more  materially  pressing. 

Tarleton  hastened  his  return  to  army  headquarters  at  Wynnes' 
borough,  and  from  thence  continued  southwestwardly  across  the 

1501 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEKS 

Broad,  to  locate  and  engage  Sumter,  who  was  approaching  Ninety 
Six.  There  followed  the  fight  at  Blackstocks  on  the  20th  of  Novem' 
ber,  wherein  General  Sumter  was  wounded.  Following  this  action 
Tarleton  withdrew  to  Brierlys  Ferry  on  the  Broad.  It  was  with 
much  gratification  that  Cornwallis  learned  of  Sumter's  wound, 
for  he  wrote,  "he  certainly  has  been  our  greatest  plague  in  this 
country." 

The  recovery  of  Cornwallis  from  his  illness  during  the  with' 
drawal  from  Charlotte  Town,  and  the  successes  attendant  upon 
Tarleton's  efforts  in  the  field,  stimulated  a  desire  to  renew  offen' 
sive  warfare,  and  in  November  he  decided  to  bring  Leslie's  force 
to  Charleston,  as  cooperation  with  him  even  at  the  distance  of  the 
Cape  Fear  River  would  be  attended  with  many  difficulties.  Leslie 
arrived  in  Charleston  on  the  13th  of  December,  where  orders 
awaited  him  to  march  up  country  with  1,530  men,  to  ioin  Corn' 
wallis  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  British  plan  of  campaign  for  the  winter  of  1780-81  was  for 
the  main  army  to  penetrate  into  North  Carolina,  leaving  South 
Carolina  in  security  against  any  probable  attack.  Offensive  opera' 
tions  were  to  be  started  about  the  middle  of  January.  The  line  of 
march  was  to  be  by  the  upper,  or  western,  roads  in  preference  to 
lowland  routes,  because  fords  were  more  frequent  above  the  forks 
of  the  rivers,  and  the  passage  of  the  army  could  be  less  easily 
obstructed.  Furthermore,  General  Greene  being  on  the  Peedee,  and 
there  being  few  fords  in  any  of  the  great  rivers  of  this  country 
below  their  forks,  especially  in  the  rainy  season,  a  penetration  north, 
by  way  of  Salisbury,  would  probably  meet  with  much  resistance  by 
Greene's  army. 

Cornwallis  was  the  more  induced  to  prefer  the  western  route,  as 
he  hoped  to  destroy  or  drive  out  of  South  Carolina  the  corps  com' 
manded  by  General  Morgan,  which,  it  will  be  noted  later,  was  sent 
into  the  region  of  the  Broad  and  Pacolet,  during  the  latter  part  of 
December,  to  threaten  the  valuable  district  of  Ninety  Six.  There 
was  hope,  also,  that  by  rapid  marches  the  British  main  army  would 

I51J 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEKS 

get  between  Greene  and  Virginia,  and  by  that  means  force  the 
Americans  to  fight  without  receiving  any  reinforcements  from  that 
State,  or,  failing  in  this,  to  oblige  Greene  to  quit  North  Carolina 
with  precipitation,  and  thereby  encourage  the  friends  of  the  Crown 
to  make  good  their  promises  of  a  general  rising  to  assist  the  British 
commander  in  reestablishing  the  Royal  Government. 

While  Tarleton  lay  on  the  Broad,  following  the  fight  at  Black' 
stocks,  it  became  known  to  the  British  that  General  Morgan  and 
Colonel  Washington  had  been  detached  from  Charlotte  Town  on 
December  20th  and  had  proceeded  across  the  Broad  in  the  direction 
of  Ninety  Six,  which  post  was  viewed  by  Cornwallis  as  the  most 
sensitive  of  all  under  his  command.  On  the  30th  of  December  Corn' 
wallis  advised  Tarleton  of  this  threat,  and  on  the  1st  of  the  follow 
ing  month  sent  his  aide  with  orders  that  Tarleton  should  cross  the 
Broad  with  his  corps  of  Cavalry  and  Infantry  of  550  men,  the  First 
Battalion  of  the  Seventy-first,  consisting  of  200  men,  and  one 
3'pounder,  to  counteract  the  designs  of  General  Morgan,  by  pro' 
tecting  the  country  and  compelling  him  to  repass  the  Broad.  The 
danger  of  Morgan's  presence  west  of  the  Broad  was  felt  so  acutely 
by  Cornwallis  that  the  day  after  he  dispatched  his  aide  with  this 
message  to  Tarleton,  he  wrote  an  additional  admonition: 

If  Morgan  is  still  at  Williams's,  or  anywhere  within  your  reach,  I  should  wish 
you  to  push  him  to  the  utmost;  I  have  not  heard,  except  from  Mc Arthur,  of  his 
having  cannon;  nor  would  I  believe  it,  unless  he  has  it  from  very  good  authority; 
it  is,  however,  possible,  and  Ninety  Six  is  of  so  much  consequence,  that  no  time 
is  to  be  lost. 

Let  me  know,  if  you  think  that  the  moving  the  whole,  or  any  part  of  my  corps, 
can  be  of  use. 

On  the  receipt  of  this  letter  Tarleton  immediately  directed  his 
course  to  the  westward,  leaving  his  baggage  behind,  but  he  had  not 
proceeded  more  than  20  miles  from  Brierleys  Ferry  before  he  was 
satisfied  that  Morgan  was  nowhere  near  Fort  Williams  and  that 
for  the  time  being  Ninety  Six  was  not  threatened.  He  therefore 
decided  to  camp,  bring  up  his  baggage,  and  make  certain  recom' 
mendations  to  Cornwallis  relative  to  the  ensuing  campaign,  as  was 

1521 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPETiS 

called  for  in  the  latter 's  letter  of  the  2d.  Tarleton  wrote  on  the  4th 
asking  that  his  baggage  be  forwarded  under  escort  of  the  Seven' 
teenth  Light  Dragoons,  the  Yagers,  and  the  Seventh  Regiment. 
"When  I  advance,  I  must  either  destroy  Morgan's  corps,"  he  said, 
"or  push  it  before  me  over  Broad  River,  toward  Kings  Mountain. 
The  advance  of  the  army  should  commence  (when  your  lordship 
orders  this  corps  to  move)  onward  for  Kings  Mountain.  Frequent 
communication  by  letter  can  pass  the  Broad  River."  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  at  this  time  Tarleton  and  Cornwallis  occupied  interior 
positions,  separated  less  than  24  hours  in  messenger  service,  while 
Morgan  and  Greene  lay  beyond  them  in  opposite  directions,  and 
from  5  to  10  days  apart  by  messenger. 

On  the  5th  of  January  Cornwallis  approved  the  suggestions 
relative  to  combined  action  as  mentioned  in  Tarleton's  letter  of  the 
day  before,  and  informed  him  that  the  Seventh  Regiment  was 
escorting  his  baggage  to  Brierleys  Ferry,  and  that  he,  Cornwallis, 
proposed  marching  on  January  7.  Two  hundred  men  of  the  Seventh 
Regiment,  who  were  mostly  recruits  and  designed  for  the  garrison 
at  Ninety  Six,  50  dragoons  of  the  Seventeenth  Regiment,  and  a 
3-pounder,  brought  the  wagons  from  Brierleys  Ferry  to  camp.  Upon 
the  arrival  of  the  baggage  and  reinforcing  troops,  Tarleton  crossed 
Indian  and  Duncan  Creeks,  and  on  his  advance  received  accounts 
of  the  increase  of  Morgan's  corps,  which  induced  him  to  halt  his 
march  and  request  permission  of  Cornwallis  to  retain  the  Seventh 
Regiment.  This  request  having  been  granted,  on  the  12th  he  con' 
tinued  his  course  to  the  westward  in  order  to  discover  the  most 
practicable  fords,  and  the  Enoree  and  Tiger  were  passed  on  the 
14th,  above  the  Cherokee  Road.  That  evening  Tarleton  obtained 
information  that  Morgan  was  on  the  Pacolet,  guarding  all  the  fords. 
In  the  meanwhile  Cornwallis's  march  northward  had  not  been 
made  in  accordance  with  his  plans,  as  the  junction  of  Leslie's  com' 
mand  had  been  much  retarded  by  high  waters,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  14th  that  "Leslie  is  at  last  out  of  the  swamps,"  at  which  time 
Cornwallis  was  at  Bull  Run. 

1531 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEJiS 

On  the  15th  Tarleton  made  a  reconnaissance  of  Morgan's  dispo- 
sitions  covering  the  fords  of  the  Pacolet,  and  that  evening  a  feint 
was  made  to  cross  high  up  the  river.  The  morning  of  the  16th  this 
course  was  altered,  as  it  was  now  known  that  Morgan  had  with' 
drawn  from  the  Pacolet,  and  a  passage  was  secured  within  6  miles 
of  the  hostile  camp.  The  British  continued  their  march  for  several 
miles,  and  halted  in  some  log  huts  to  resT;  and  reconnoiter  Morgan's 
whereabouts.  Tarleton  intended  to  post  his  troops  behind  the 
huts  in  case  Morgan  showed  an  inclination  to  attack  him  in  this 
position.  In  his  narrative  he  says  that  the  camp  afforded  a  plentiful 
supply  of  half-cooked  provisions,  left  by  the  Americans  that  day. 
Patrols  and  spies  were  dispatched  to  observe  the  Americans  dur- 
ing  the  night,  and  dragoons  followed  until  dark,  when  they  were 
ordered  back  to  the  main  body.  Early  in  the  night  the  patrols 
reported  that  Morgan  had  withdrawn  to  Thicketty  Creek,  and 
that  several  groups  of  partisans  were  en  route  to  join  him.  Tarleton 
determined  to  push  ahead  promptly  for  the  purpose  of  engaging 
Morgan  before  he  could  effedt  a  passage  of  the  Broad,  and  before 
his  numbers  were  too  greatly  augmented.  Accordingly  at  3  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  17th  the  pursuit  was  resumed.  The  wagons 
and  baggage  of  his  train  were  left  in  camp  under  the  protection  of  a 
small  detachment  from  each  corps. 


154: 


Part  II 


AMERICAN  PLANS 
MORGAN  SENT  WEST  OF  THE  CATAWBA 

!  HE  disaster  which  befell  the  American  Army 
at  Camden  on  the  16th  of  August  resulted 

TS$p^  in  Congress  passing  a  resolution  on  the  5th 
!§jH  of  October  ordering  General  Washington  to 
g^j|j  direct  a  court  of  inquiry  to  be  held  on  the  con' 
dud:  of  Major  General  Gates,  as  commander  of 
the  southern  army,  and  to  appoint  his  succes- 
sor.  Washington  designated  Maj.  Gen.  Nathanael  Greene,  second 
in  command  in  the  main  army,  and  an  officer  whose  ability,  loyalty, 
and  capacity  for  command  were  fully  appreciated  by  the  commander 
in  chief.  On  the  receipt  of  instructions  from  General  Washington 
and  Congress,  Greene  proceeded  south,  stopping  in  Philadelphia  to 
confer  with  Congress,  and  in  the  several  States  on  his  way,  which 
were  immediately  concerned  in  furnishing  men  and  supplies  for  the 
Southern  Department.  He  desired  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the 
military  situation  therein,  and  plan  for  the  regular  support  and  sub- 
sistence of  his  command  in  provisions,  forage,  and  transportation. 
Before  leaving  Philadelphia  he  wrote  to  Washington  that  his  first 
object  would  be  to  equip  a  flying  army  of  800  horses  and  1,000 
Infantry.  Greene  held  the  services  of  Cavalry  and  mounted  Infan- 
try in  high  regard,  the  contrary  view  being  entertained  by  the 
officer  whom  he  was  to  relieve.  Lieut.  Col.  Henry  Lee  was  one  of 
the  officers  whom  he  desired  to  conduct  partisan  warfare,  which  he 
knew  would  constitute  an  important  factor  in  his  campaigns. 

General  Greene  reached  Charlotte  Town,  where  Gates's  head- 
quarters were  now  established,  on  the  2d  of  December,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  latter  issued  his  final  order  to  the  troops,  turning 
the  command  over  to  General  Greene.  While  traversing  Maryland, 

1551 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

Virginia,  and  North  Carolina,  wise  and  energetic  measures  had 
been  taken  by  Greene,  in  consultation  with  the  State  authorities, 
to  insure  that  cooperation  and  assistance  would  be  forthcoming. 
A  survey  of  his  troops  at  once  confirmed  his  previous  knowledge 
of  their  needs  for  food,  clothing,  transportation,  and  shelter,  as 
learned  from  Gates's  reports  on  these  matters,  and  his  attention  to 
the  correction  of  these  deficiencies  was  incessant  and  laborious. 
His  ability  as  a  quartermaster  was  in  no  wise  inferior  to  his  worth 
as  a  commander  in  the  field,  and  the  detailed  manner  in  which  he 
directed  the  betterment  of  conditions  is  a  high  tribute  to  his  general 
efficiency.  The  logistics  of  supply  were  carefully  covered  in  his 
many  instructions  for  the  surveys  of  all  possible  water  routes,  the 
construction  of  bateaux,  the  listing  of  animals  and  wagons  for  trans' 
portation,  and  for  the  operation  of  mills,  ironworks,  and  other 
utilities. 

Pending  improvement  in  his  numbers,  and  augmentation  in  the 
necessary  supplies,  the  army  was  to  remain  inactive.  The  country 
around  Charlotte  Town  had  been  depleted  so  thoroughly  of  food 
and  forage,  that  on  the  8th  of  December  Greene  wrote  to  Colonel 
Kosciusko  to  examine  the  country  along  the  Peedee  for  a  distance 
of  20  or  30  miles  south  of  Little  River,  for  a  good  position  for  the 
army. 

During  this  enforced  period  of  combat  inaction  and  rehabilita' 
tion,  intelligence  of  the  enemy  was  most  essential,  particularly  in 
view  of  the  many  rumors  that  Cornwallis  was  to  be  reinforced  by 
way  of  the  Cape  Fear,  or  through  Charleston.  For  this  work  troops 
that  were  well  mounted  and  extremely  mobile  were  necessary,  due 
to  the  great  distance  covered,  and  Marion,  who  operated  in  the 
eastern  part  of  South  Carolina,  was  selected  for  this  duty.  On  the 
4th  of  December  a  letter  of  instructions  was  sent  to  this  officer  by 
Greene  directing  him  to  continue  partisan  warfare,  thereby  harass* 
ing  the  enemy  and  preserving  the  tide  of  sentiment  among  the 
people  as  much  as  possible  in  favor  of  the  patriotic  cause.  Upon 
Marion  he  would  depend  for  early  information  of  reinforcements 

1561 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

arriving  in  Charleston,  or  departing  therefrom  to  join  Cornwallis. 
To  secure  this  information,  and  other  that  might  be  necessary, 
Marion  was  to  employ  spies  and  organise  an  intelligence  service. 
The  unhappy  condition  of  the  southern  army  is  pictured  in  a 
letter  written  to  Washington  on  the  7th  of  December,  wherein 
Greene  says : 

Nothing  can  be  more  wretched  and  distressing  than  the  condition  of  the 
troops,  starving,  with  cold  and  hunger,  without  tents  and  camp  equipage.  Those 
of  the  Virginia  line  are  literally  naked,  and  a  great  part  totally  unfit  for  any  kind 
of  duty,  and  musT:  remain  so  until  clothing  can  be  had  from  the  northward. 

The  magnitude  of  the  work  confronting  Greene  in  his  responsi' 
bility  for  the  retention  of  the  Southern  States  in  the  Confederation, 
and  the  earnestness  with  which  he  engaged  in  his  labors,  will  be 
understood  by  reading  the  seven  lengthy  letters  written  by  him  on 
the  6th  and  7th  of  December  to  Baron  von  Steuben,  who  was  in 
Virginia  under  his  command,  General  Washington,  General  Knox, 
the  President  of  Congress,  the  Board  of  War,  Governor  Nash,  and 
Governor  Jefferson. 

After  two  weeks  of  arduous  attention  to  a  multitude  of  details, 
report  having  been  received  in  the  meanwhile  from  Kosciusko  of  a 
favorable  site  for  the  army  on  the  Peedee,  the  troops  were  put 
under  marching  orders  on  the  16th,  but  due  to  heavy  rains  the 
march  was  postponed  until  the  20th.  The  route  followed  was  by 
way  of  Wadesborough  to  Haleys  Ferry,  thence  to  the  position 
selected  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Peedee,  opposite  to  Cheraw  Hill, 
which  was  reached  on  the  26th.  General  Greene  called  his  new 
location  a  "camp  of  repose,"  adding  in  this  connection,  in  a  letter 
to  Washington  written  on  the  28th  of  December,  "no  army  ever 
wanted  one  more,  the  troops  having  totally  lost  their  discipline." 

General  Greene  was  fortunate  in  his  selection  of  officers  to  sur' 
round  him,  and  part  of  his  success  in  the  South  must  be  attributed 
to  these  capable  leaders  and  administrators.  There  were  Von  Steu- 
ben, Lee  and  his  legion,  which  joined  on  the  Peedee  early  in  January, 
Williams,  Morgan,  William  Washington,  Howard,  Carrington, 

1571 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

Davie,  and  the  partisan  leaders,  Sumter,  Marion,  Pickens,  and 
others,  all  highly  reputed  as  leaders  in  their  several  lines  of  activities, 
imbued  with  a  spirit  of  loyalty  for  their  commander,  and  possessed 
of  an  unquenchable  determination  to  attain  the  independence  of 
their  country. 

Before  departing  from  Charlotte  Town,  General  Greene  arranged 
to  send  General  Morgan  with  an  independent  command  to  operate 
along  the  tributaries  of  the  Broad  and  Pacolet,  threatening  the  Brit' 
ish  post  at  Ninety  Six  and  the  left  of  Cornwallis's  army.  During 
the  great  depression  which  existed  in  the  South  after  the  defeat  of 
Gates  at  Camden,  and  while  the  British  were  triumphantly  advanc 
ing  to  Charlotte  Town,  Morgan  had  returned  to  active  duty  in  the 
Army  and  joined  Gates  at  Hillsborough  in  September.  Congress 
appointed  him  a  brigadier  general  on  the  13th  of  October. 

The  duty  to  be  performed  by  Morgan's  command  was  so  far 
removed  from  Greene's  headquarters,  with  the  British  Army 
between,  that  detailed  instructions  were  prepared  for  his  guidance: 

Camp  Charlotte,  December  16, 1780. 

You  are  appointed  to  the  command  of  a  corps  of  light  infantry  of  320  men 
detached  from  the  Maryland  line,  a  detachment  of  Virginia  militia  of  200  men, 
and  Colonel  Washington's  regiment  of  light  horse,  amounting  to  from  sixty  to  a 
hundred  men.  With  these  troops  you  will  proceed  to  the  west,  side  of  the  Catawba 
River,  where  you  will  be  joined  by  a  body  of  volunteer  militia  under  command 
of  General  Davidson  of  this  State,  and  by  the  militia  lately  under  command  of 
General  Sumter.  This  force  and  such  others  as  may  join  you  from  Georgia,  you 
will  employ  against,  the  enemy  on  the  west,  side  of  the  Catawba,  either  Offensively 
or  defensively,  as  your  own  prudence  and  discretion  may  dired: — ading  with 
caution  and  avoiding  surprises  by  every  possible  precaution.  For  the  present,  I 
give  you  the  entire  command  in  that  quarter,  and  do  hereby  require  all  officers 
and  soldiers  engaged  in  the  American  cause  to  be  subject-  to  your  orders  and 
commands. 

The  object  of  this  detachment  is  to  give  prote dtion  to  that  part  of  the  country 
and  spirit  up  the  people — to  annoy  the  enemy  in  that  quarter — to  collect  the 
provision  and  forage  out  of  their  way — which  you  will  have  formed  into  a  num' 
ber  of  small  magazines  in  the  rear  of  the  position  you  may  think  proper  to  take. 
You  will  prevent  plundering  as  much  as  possible  and  be  as  careful  of  your 
provisions  and  forage  as  may  be,  giving  receipts  for  whatever  you  take  to  all  such 
as  are  friends  to  the  independence  of  America. 

H58J 


THE  BATTLE   OF   THE    COWPEHS 

Should  the  enemy  move  in  force  toward  the  Pee  Dee,  where  the  army  will  take 
a  position,  you  will  move  in  such  a  direction  as  to  enable  you  to  join  me  if  neces' 
sary,  or  fall  upon  the  flank,  or  into  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  as  occasion  may  require. 
You  will  spare  no  pains  to  get  good  intelligence  of  the  enemy's  situation  and  keep 
me  constantly  advised  of  both  your  and  their  movements.  You  will  appoint,  for 
the  time  being,  a  commissary,  quartermaster,  and  forage  master,  who  will  follow 
your  instructions  in  their  respective  lines.  Confiding  in  your  abilities  and  activity, 
I  entrust  you  with  this  command,  being  persuaded  you  will  do  everything  in  your 
power  to  distress  the  enemy  and  afford  protection  to  the  country. 

Given  under  my  hand  at  Charlotte  this  16th  December,  1780. 

To  Brig.  Gen.  Morgan.  Nath-  Greene- 

Morgan's  command  of  approximately  600  men  left  Charlotte 
Town  on  the  21st  of  December,  reaching  the  Catawba  that  evening, 
and  the  following  morning  crossed  the  river  at  Biggers  Ferry.  From 
thence  the  march  led  to  Cane  Creek,  and  the  following  day,  the 
24th,  the  Broad  was  crossed,  and  on  the  25th  camp  was  made  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Pacolet,  at  Grindalls  Ford.  Here  Morgan 
was  joined,  a  few  days  later,  by  a  party  of  mounted  militia  under 
Colonel  Pickens  and  Major  McCall. 

Early  in  December  General  Greene  had  given  orders  to  General 
Davidson,  of  North  Carolina,  to  join  Morgan  with  militia  gathered 
from  that  State,  when  the  latter  had  crossed  the  river;  but  the 
British  authorities  incited  the  Cherokee  Indians  to  ravage  the  west- 
ern settlements,  and  the  men  of  Burke,  Rutherford,  Washington, 
and  Sullivan  Counties  were  engaged  in  safeguarding  their  homes. 
Davidson  did  arrive  in  Morgan's  camp  on  the  Pacolet  toward  the 
end  of  December  with  120  men,  but  returned  at  once  to  North 
Carolina  for  the  drafts  that  had  been  ordered  to  assemble  in  the 
district  of  Salisbury. 

On  the  27th  of  December  Morgan  received  intelligence  that  a 
body  of  Georgia  Tories,  about  250  in  number,  had  advanced  as  far 
as  Fair  Forest,  and  were  committing  depredations  in  that  region. 
For  the  purpose  of  routing  them  he  sent  Washington's  dragoons, 
and  200  mounted  militia  under  Major  McCall,  on  the  29th.  The 
hostile  force  was  about  20  miles  from  Grindalls  Ford,  in  the  direction 

I59J 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

of  Ninety  Six.  The  enemy  withdrew  on  the  approach  of  Wash' 
ington's  command,  but  after  a  hard  march  of  40  miles  they  were 
encountered  the  next  day  at  Hammonds  Storehouse,  and  dispersed 
with  great  loss.  Although  at  considerable  distance  from  support' 
ing  troops,  and  within  range  of  Ninety  Six  and  Wynnesborough, 
Washington  proceeded  to  march  against  a  British  post  called  Fort 
Williams,  on  the  road  from  Wynnesborough  to  Ninety  Six,  and 
about  15  miles  northeast  of  the  latter  place.  General  Cunningham, 
who  was  in  charge  of  the  Tory  militia  in  this  region,  evacuated  the 
fort,  and  Washington  perceived  the  wisdom  of  retracing  his  steps 
to  the  Pacolet.  In  the  meanwhile  Morgan  detached  200  men  to 
cover  the  withdrawal  of  Washington's  command,  to  guard  against 
any  misfortune  that  might  occur  to  it. 

At  the  time  of  reporting  the  success  at  Hammonds  Storehouse, 
Morgan  wrote  to  Greene  on  the  31st  that  the  militia  were  coming 
in  fast,  and  suggested  that  when  he  had  collected  his  force  he 
desired  to  march  into  Georgia,  if  the  main  army  could,  at  the  time, 
make  a  diversion  against  Cornwallis.  To  expedite  this  movement, 
should  it  meet  with  the  approval  of  General  Greene,  he  had  sent 
for  100  swords,  which  he  intended  putting  into  the  hands  of  expert 
riflemen,  to  be  mounted  and  incorporated  with  Washington's  corps. 
He  said,  "It  is  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  light  troops  to  be 
encumbered  with  baggage,"  and  called  for  100  packsaddles  to 
replace  wagon  transportation,  where  necessary  or  desirable. 

Morgan  remained  on  the  Pacolet  to  await  a  reply  to  his  letter 
of  the  31st  of  December  covering  the  foregoing  suggestion,  but 
developments  were  now  so  rapid  that  it  became  impossible  to  give 
further  serious  thought  to  a  march  on  Georgia.  Greene  knew  that 
Leslie  was  advancing  on  Camden,  at  which  place  a  strong  post  had 
been  established  under  Lord  Rawdon,  and  in  replying  on  the  8th 
of  January  to  Morgan's  letter  which  reached  him  the  7th,  he 
did  not  think  an  expedition  into  Georgia  was  "warrantable  in  the 
critical  situation  our  Army  is  in."  "Should  you  go  into  Georgia, 
and  the  enemy  push  this  way,  your  whole  force  will  be  useless." 

1601 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEKS 

Greene  intimated  to  Morgan  that  by  remaining  where  he  was  he 
was  favorably  situated  to  interrupt  communications  with  Ninety 
Six  and  Augusta,  and  to  harass  the  enemy  rear  should  Cornwallis 
attempt  to  push  forward.  He  was  cautioned  to  attempt  no  major 
enterprise,  unless  by  surprise,  "for  you  will  only  beat  your  heads 
against  the  wall  without  success."  As  a  further  warning,  Greene 
added:  "I  must  repeat  my  caution  to  you  to  guard  against  a 
surprise." 

Before  receiving  from  General  Greene  a  reply  to  his  letter  of 
December  31,  Morgan  wrote  the  former  again  on  January  4,  as  to 
the  difficulties  of  obtaining  forage  and  provisions  in  the  vicinity  of 
his  camp,  and  declared  the  necessity  either  to  move  into  Georgia  or 
retreat.  He  had  spies  watching  the  enemy  and  did  not  consider 
himself  in  danger  of  being  surprised.  Greene  replied  to  this  com' 
munication  on  the  13th  with  the  advice  that  Morgan  hold  his  pres' 
ent  ground,  as  a  retreat  would  discourage  the  militia,  and  informed 
him  that  "Colonel  Tarleton  is  said  to  be  on  his  way  to  pay  you  a 
visit."  This  letter  did  not  reach  its  destination  before  the  action  at 
the  Cowpens. 

On  the  14th  of  January  Morgan  learned  that  Tarleton  had 
crossed  the  Tiger  at  Musgroves  Mill,  and  he  prepared  to  change 
his  position  in  the  direction  of  the  Broad.  Leaving  detachments  to 
observe  the  fords  over  the  Pacolet,  the  army  was  put  in  motion  on 
the  15th,  and  that  evening  camped  at  Burrs  Mills  on  Thicketty 
Creek.  It  was  on  this  same  day  that  Tarleton  reached  the  Pacolet 
and  reconnoitered  the  crossings.  His  strength  was  estimated  by 
Morgan  to  be  from  1,100  to  1,200  men. 

Continuing  his  retirement  on  the  16th,  the  Cowpens  were 
reached,  where  small  parties  joined  during  the  night,  and  the  spirit 
of  the  camp  was  strong  for  fight.  Morgan  doubtless  viewed  this 
augmentation  of  strength  and  the  high  spirits  of  the  men  as  a  favor' 
able  omen,  and  determined  to  offer  battle  the  following  day.  The 
proposed  plan  of  deployment  was  explained  to  the  several  leaders, 
particular  attention  being  given  to  the  part  the  militia,  whom 

1611 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

Pickens  was  to  command,  would  take  in  the  battle.  For  the  purpose 
of  strengthening  Washington's  Cavalry,  45  militia  were  selected 
for  their  ability  as  horsemen  and  rifle  shots,  armed  with  sabers, 
provided  with  suitable  mounts,  and  attached  to  the  dragoons. 


H62J 


Part  III 


DEPLOYMENT  OF  TROOPS  "-THE  BATTLE 

iHE  place  where  General  Morgan  established 
his  camp  the  night  of  the  16th  was  near  the 

T2&p2  intersection  of  the  Mill  Gap  Road  and  the 
£jdCn  road  from  the  present  city  of  Spartanburg 
:~M&  running  northeast  into  North  Carolina,  and 
crossing  the  Broad  River  at  Island  Ford, 
Many  roads  of  more  recent  construction  now 
traverse  this  territory,  but  during  the  Revolutionary  period  they 
were  few  in  number.  The  Mill  Gap  Road  crossed  the  Broad  at 
Cherokee  Ford  and  ran  northwestwardly  through  the  present  town 
of  Gaffney,  into  the  mountains  far  to  the  west.  Its  course  followed 
generally  the  tops  of  ridges,  thereby  avoiding  the  crossing  of 
creeks  and  rivers.  The  road  from  Spartanburg  to  North  Carolina 
now  runs  through  Chesnee,  but  in  olden  days  it  crossed  the  Mill 
Gap  Road  about  3  miles  southeast  of  Chesnee.  Morgan  made  camp 
in  a  wooded  ravine  having  a  stream  of  water  running  through  it, 
which  lay  north  of  the  Mill  Gap  Road,  and  about  a  thousand  yards 
northwest  of  the  cabin  of  Robert  Scruggs,  which  was  visited  by 
Lossing  in  1849. 

The  position  selected  for  the  action  lay  on  both  sides  of  the  Mill 
Gap  Road,  just  south  of  the  camp.  The  ground  is  slightly  undulat' 
ing,  and  at  the  time  was  covered  with  scattered  trees  of  red  oak, 
hickory,  and  pine.  Being  used  for  the  gracing  of  cattle,  there  was 
but  little,  if  any,  underbrush.  Two  very  slight  elevations  top  the 
ridge  along  which  the  Mill  Gap  Road  runs,  and  these  were  selected 
as  the  lines  of  deployment  for  the  American  troops. 

The  main  position  was  on  the  elevation  just  south  of  the  ravine, 
in  which  camp  was  established.  To  its  front  for  300  yards  there  is 
a  scarcely  perceptible  slope  downward;  beyond  this  the  slope  is 


631 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEKS 

greater,  dropping  off  into  a  shallow  ravine  700  yards  from  the  main 
position.  To  the  rear  of  the  main  position,  and  just  west  of  the 
camp  site,  is  an  elevation  slightly  higher  than  that  of  the  main  posi' 
tion.  This  ridge  continues  across  the  road  in  a  south  and  southwest 
direction,  but  at  a  slightly  less  elevation.  From  either  ridge  the 
terrain  between  the  two  was  visible  under  and  through  the  trees. 
The  ground  offered  no  cover  for  either  the  attack  or  the  defense, 
except  such  as  was  furnished  by  the  trees.  The  flanks  of  both 
armies  were  exposed,  as  the  terrain  was  favorable  in  all  directions 
for  the  operation  of  mounted  troops.  The  ravine  in  which  Morgan 
camped  and  one  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road  offered  but  little 
interference  with  the  movement  of  foot  or  mounted  troops. 

Morgan's  plan  of  battle  was  to  use  the  Maryland  Continentals 
and  the  Virginia  Militia  (of  worth  equal  to  the  Continentals,  as 
many  had  served  in  previous  campaigns)  in  his  main  position  on  the 
summit  of  the  southernmost  ridge  and  astride  the  Mill  Gap  Road. 
Washington's  dragoons  to  the  number  of  80,  augmented  by  the  45 
militia  under  McCall,  were  the  main  reserve,  posted  in  rear  of  the 
northernmost  ridge,  where  ground  cover  was  sufficient  to  protect 
them  from  hostile  observation  and  fire  and  sufficiently  near  "as  to 
be  able  to  charge  the  enemy,  should  they  be  broken."  The  militia 
were  to  form  an  interrupted  line  on  the  flanks  in  front,  which  posi' 
tion  was  to  be  held  only  temporarily,  when  they  were  to  withdraw 
and  reform  on  the  flanks  of  the  main  position  after  reorgani2ation 
had  been  effected  and  lend  what  assistance  they  could  as  an 
additional  reserve. 

At  this  time  Howard's  Maryland  and  Delaware  Continentals 
consisted  of  237  men.  They  were  placed  on  the  left  of  the  line, 
astride  the  Mill  Gap  Road.  To  their  right  were  Captain  Beatie's 
and  Major  Triplett's  companies  of  Virginia  Militia,  under  the 
command  of  the  latter,  and  totaling  about  100  men.  Captains  Tate 
and  Buchanan,  with  about  100  of  the  Augusta  riflemen  of  Vir' 
ginia,  supported  the  right  of  the  line.  In  the  advanced  position, 
which  was  to  be  abandoned  early  in  the  fight,  were  about  308 
militia  from  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  under 

I64J 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

Colonel  Pickens.  These  troops  were  situated  to  guard  the  flanks. 
Major  McDowell,  of  the  North  Carolina  Volunteers,  was  posted 
on  the  right  flank,  150  yards  in  front  of  Howard's  line.  Major  Cun- 
ningham, of  the  Georgia  Volunteers,  was  on  the  left  flank,  at  the 
same  distance  in  front  of  Howard's  line.  To  the  right  of  Major 
McDowell  were  posted  the  South  Carolina  Volunteers  under 
Colonels  Brannon  and  Thomas.  To  the  left  of  Major  Cunningham 
was  posted  the  remainder  of  the  South  Carolina  Militia,  under 
Colonel  Hays  and  Major  Hammond.  The  latter  commanded  Major 
McCall's  regiment,  he  being  with  Colonel  Washington. 

From  Pickens's  line  of  militia  small  parties  of  riflemen  were 
sent  150  yards  farther  to  the  front  to  skirmish  with  the  enemy. 
McDowell  commanded  those  in  the  right  sector  of  the  skirmish 
line  and  Cunningham  those  in  the  left  sector.  Patrols  covered  the 
front  and  flanks  to  give  warning  of  Tarleton's  approach. 

Tarleton  broke  camp  at  3  o'clock  in  the  morning,  determined  to 
engage  the  Americans  before  they  could  cross  the  Broad,  or  in  case 
they  made  an  early  march  and  continued  their  withdrawal,  to  strike 
them  when  astride  the.  river.  The  baggage  and  wagons  were  to 
remain  in  camp,  under  protection  of  a  detachment  from  each  corps, 
until  daybreak.  The  advance  guard  consisted  of  three  companies 
of  light  infantry,  supported  by  the  legion  infantry.  The  main  body 
comprised  the  Seventh  Regiment,  the  two  3'pounders,  and  the 
First  Battalion  of  the  Seventy'first  Infantry.  The  cavalry  and 
mounted  infantry  brought  up  the  rear.  The  march  was  slow,  due 
to  the  ground  being  broken  by  creeks  and  ravines,  and  the  necessity 
for  careful  reconnaissance  on  the  front  and  flanks.  Before  dawn  a 
screen  of  cavalry  was  placed  on  the  front,  soon  after  which  contact 
was  made  with  the  American  patrols,  when  Tarleton  ordered  two 
troops  of  dragoons  to  reinforce  the  advance  guard  and  harass  the 
rear  of  the  enemy. 

In  due  course  of  time  the  advance  guard  reported  that  the  Amer- 
icans were  forming,  and  the  native  guides  with  Tarleton  described 
their  position  as  in  an  open  woods,  free  from  swamps,  with  the 
Broad  parallel  to  their  rear. 

1651 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

Tarleton  viewed  the  enemy's  situation  as  one  vulnerable  to 
attack,  particularly  in  view  of  his  superiority  in  cavalry,  and  the 
inability  of  a  defeated  force  to  escape  beyond  the  Broad.  Further' 
more,  the  supposed  nearness  of  Cornwallis  and  the  assumed  supe' 
riority  of  his  regulars  over  the  large  percentage  of  militia  with 
Morgan  made  it  seem  apparent  that  success  should  be  attended 
with  no  great  loss  to  his  command.  His  total  strength,  including 
the  detachment  left  to  guard  the  baggage,  was  about  1,000. 

The  dragoons  in  the  advance  guard  drove  in  the  hostile  covering 
forces  along  the  Mill  Gap  Road,  thereby  enabling  Tarleton  to  pre 
ceed  far  enough  to  inspect  the  deployment  of  Morgan's  army.  It 
is  probable  that  his  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  opposing  forces 
was  considerably  less  than  the  total  of  1,920  mentioned  later  in  his 
narrative.  Even  though  he  believed  that  he  was  opposed  by  about 
500  Continentals,  120  cavalry,  1,000  militia,  and  300  backwoods' 
men,  he  probably  ignored  the  two  latter  groups,  and  considered 
himself  superior  in  quality  to  the  American  Continentals  and 
cavalry,  who  made  a  force  much  smaller  than  his  regulars. 

Prior  to  deploying  the  infantry  were  directed  to  discard  all 
surplus  equipment  and  retain  only  their  rifles  and  ammunition. 
The  light  infantry  then  filed  to  the  right,  into  a  position  opposite 
to  Morgan's  militia,  with  their  right  flank  extending  as  far  as  the 
left  of  the  militia.  The  legion  infantry  were  added  to  the  left  of  the 
light  infantry,  and  a  3'pounder  placed  in  the  line  between  the  two 
commands.  This  force  was  instructed  to  advance  within  300  yards 
of  the  enemy.  When  this  position  was  reached,  the  Seventh  Regi' 
ment  formed  upon  the  left  of  the  legion  infantry,  and  the  other 
3'pounder  was  given  to  the  right  division  of  the  Seventh.  A  captain, 
with  50  dragoons,  was  placed  on  each  flank  of  the  line,  to  protect 
its  flanks  and  threaten  those  of  the  enemy.  The  First  Battalion  of 
the  Seventy'first  Regiment  formed  150  yards  in  rear  of  the  left 
flank  of  the  Seventh,  and  constituted,  together  with  about  200 
legion  cavalry,  the  reserve. 

The  British  deployment  being  completed  at  about  8  o'clock, 
Tarleton  ordered  his  troops  to  attack.  The  whole  line  moved  with 

166! 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    GOWPEHS 

the  greatest  impetuosity,  shouting  as  they  advanced.  The  Ameri' 
cans  responded  with  Indian  war  cries  of  equal  intensity,  and  held 
their  fire  until  the  enemy  closed  to  effective  rifle  range,  when  the 
front'line  skirmishers  under  Cunningham  and  McDowell  gave  them 
a  "heavy  and  galling  fire,  and  retreated  to  the  regiments  intended 
for  their  support."  Tarleton's  infantry  suffered  but  little  from  this 
fire  and  continued  their  approach  to  Pickens's  line,  which  "kept  up 
a  fire  by  regiments,  retreating  agreeably  to  their  orders."  Still  the 
British  line  suffered  but  little,  and  now  it  approached  the  Conti- 
nentals and  the  Virginians  under  Howard.  Here,  according  to 
Morgan,  they  received  a  "  well'directed  and  incessant  fire."  Tarle- 
ton  says  "the  fire  on  both  sides  was  well  supported,  and  produced 
much  slaughter."  The  British  advance  was  temporarily  checked. 

At  this  time  Tarleton  sent  the  troop  of  dragoons  on  the  right  of 
the  line  to  harass  that  portion  of  the  militia  which  had  fallen  back 
to  the  left  of  Pickens's  line,  and  at  the  same  time  ordered  forward 
his  reserve.  The  First  Battalion  of  the  Seventy-first  was  directed  to 
pass  the  left  of  the  Seventh  before  delivering  its  fire.  The  reserve 
cavalry  and  the  troop  on  the  left  of  the  line  were  ordered  to  incline 
to  the  left  and  form  a  line  which  would  embrace  the  whole  of  the 
American  right  flank.  When  the  battalion  of  the  Seventy 'first  was 
in  position,  the  entire  British  line  moved  forward.  Tarleton  now 
had  about  750  infantry  in  line,  supported  by  two  guns,  and  was 
opposed  by  less  than  450  infantry  in  Howard's  line.  Whether  or 
not  the  militia,  which  had  withdrawn  to  the  two  flanks  of  Howard's 
line,  could  be  later  assembled  and  used  in  the  fight  could  not  at  this 
time  be  determined.  Those  who  had  withdrawn  to  the  left  rear  of 
the  main  position  were  charged  by  the  troop  of  dragoons  from  the 
right  of  Tarleton's  line  and  were  being  cut  down,  when  Washing' 
ton  countercharged  with  his  cavalry,  supported  by  some  infantry 
fire,  and  relieved  the  situation  in  that  quarter. 

It  was  evident  to  Howard  that  with  the  enemy  reserve  brought 
into  action  his  right  flank  was  exposed,  and  he  ordered  the  flank 
company  to  change  front  to  the  right.  In  doing  this  some  confusion 

167! 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

ensued,  and  first  a  part  and  then  the  whole  of  the  company  com' 
menced  a  retreat.  The  officers  along  Howard's  line  seeing  this,  and 
supposing  that  orders  had  been  given  for  a  retreat,  faced  their  men 
about  and  moved  off.  Morgan,  at  this  time,  was  engaged  in  reform' 
ing  the  militia,  and  was  surprised  to  observe  the  Maryland  and 
Delaware  Continentals,  who  had  fought  so  valiantly  at  Camden,  in 
apparent  retreat.  He  quickly  rode  over  to  Howard  to  inquire  into 
the  situation  and  his  apprehensions  were  quieted  when  Howard, 
pointing  to  the  line,  observed  that  "men  were  not  beaten  who 
retreated  in  that  order."  Morgan  then  ordered  Howard  to  continue 
retiring  his  line  until  the  rising  ground  to  the  rear  was  reached,  and 
rode  back  to  select  the  position  on  which  the  line  was  to  halt  and 
face  about. 

The  halt  and  change  of  front  was  effected  without  mishap,  and 
although  this  retreat  resulted  from  misunderstanding,  it  was  very 
fortunate,  as  Howard's  units  were  thereby  extricated  from  a  posi' 
tion  wherein  they  doubtless  would  have  been  defeated  with  heavy 
losses. 

So  certain  were  the  British  that  victory  was  at  hand  that  they 
pushed  forward  to  close  in  on  the  retreating  force  with  the  bayonet, 
and  an  order  was  dispatched  to  the  cavalry  on  the  right  to  charge. 
Not  more  than  30  yards  separated  them  from  the  Americans,  when 
the  latter  unexpectedly  halted  and  changed  front,  and  again  con' 
fronted  them  with  a  deadly  volley,  which  stopped  the  British  in 
their  tracks  and  threw  them  into  great  confusion. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Howard  observing  this,  gave  orders  for  the  line  to  charge 
bayonets,  which  was  done  with  such  address,  that  they  fled  with  the  utmost 
precipitation,  leaving  their  field  pieces  in  our  possession. 

Some  of  the  militia  which  had  withdrawn  to  Howard's  right 
were  reformed  and  participated  in  the  rout. 

Further  exertions  to  make  the  British  infantry  advance  were  use' 
less.  Nor  could  Tarleton's  cavalry  strike,  for  it  was  at  the  moment 
when  they  were  prepared  to  charge  the  retreating  line  that  Howard 
halted  and  faced  his  command  about,  and  the  panic  which  seised 

1681 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

the  British  infantry  extended  to  the  cavalry  also,  and  a  general 
flight  ensued.  Tarleton  sent  directions  to  his  cavalry  to  form  about 
400  yards  to  the  right  of  the  enemy,  whilst  he  endeavored  to  rally 
the  infantry  to  protect  the  guns. 

The  cavalry  did  not  comply  with  the  order,  and  the  effort  to  collect  the  infantry 
was  ineffectual;  neither  promises  nor  threats  could  gain  their  attention;  they  suf 
rendered  or  dispersed,  and  abandoned  the  guns  to  the  artillerymen,  who  defended 
them  for  some  time  with  exemplary  resolution. 

In  this  last;  stage  of  defeat,  Tarleton  in  his  narrative  says  that  he 
made  a  final  struggle  to  bring  his  cavalry  to  the  charge,  but  all 
attempts  to  restore  order  proved  fruitless. 

Above  200  dragoons  forsook  their  leader  and  left  the  field  of  battle. 

He  was  able  to  rally  a  group  of  14  officers  and  about  40  horse' 
men,  and  with  these  engaged  the  cavalry  of  Washington,  who  in 
the  latter  stage  of  the  fight  were  adding  to  the  general  confusion  of 
the  enemy  by  passing  around  Howard's  right  and  charging  into  the 
broken  ranks  of  the  enemy.  The  contest  between  the  two  mounted 
groups  was  short  lived,  and  Tarleton  fled  from  the  field,  the  action 
having  lasted  about  50  minutes.  He  directed  his  course  to  the  south' 
east  in  order  to  reach  Hamilton  Ford,  near  the  mouth  of  Bullock 
Creek,  where  he  might  communicate  with  Cornwallis,  who  had 
not  advanced  beyond  Turkey  Creek.  A  part  of  Washington's  com' 
mand  pursued  scattered  groups  of  the  enemy  cavalry  for  some 
distance,  returning  to  camp  late  that  night. 

The  British  losses,  as  reported  by  General  Morgan  in  a  letter 
dated  the  19th  of  January,  were  10  officers  and  100  noncommis' 
sioned  officers  and  privates  killed;  200  rank  and  file  wounded;  502 
noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  prisoners,  independent  of 
the  wounded,  and  29  commissioned  officers  prisoners.  This  totals 
approximately  841,  and  is  somewhat  in  excess  of  the  entire  British 
infantry  and  artillery  personnel  in  the  battle.  The  losses  in  the 
legion  cavalry  were  not  heavy,  and  that  night  and  the  next  day  200 
of  their  scattered  numbers  rejoined  Tarleton.  The  spoils  of  war 

1691 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

included  2  standards,  2  field  pieces,  800  stand  of  arms,  100  dragoon 
horses,  and  35  wagons.  The  baggage  which  had  been  left  in  camp 
was  in  a  great  measure  destroyed  by  its  guard  before  they  fled. 

Cornwallis1s  return  of  troops  shows  the  following  changes  in 
the  organizations  under  Tarleton's  command : 


Jan.  15 

Feb.  1 

167 

249 
69 

451 

Seventy 'firft  Regiment: 

FirSt  Battalion 

174 

936 

174 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  Tarleton  had  about  40  men  of  the 
Seventeenth  Dragoons  and  a  detachment  of  artillery  to  man  the 
two  3'pounders.  The  American  losses  were  inconsiderable,  there 
not  having  been  more  than  12  killed  and  about  60  wounded. 

Tarleton  attributed  his  defeat  to — 

the  bravery  or  good  conduit  of  the  Americans;  to  the  loose  manner  of  forming 
which  had  always  been  practiced  by  the  King's  troops  in  America;  or  to  some 
unforeseen  event,  which  may  throw  terror  into  the  most  disciplined  soldiers  or 
counteract  the  best-concerted  designs. 

He  held  the  opinion  that  commanding  officers  in  the  Army,  who 
were  unfortunate  in  action,  should  be  subject  to  the  same  rules 
which  governed  the  Navy,  to  the  effect  that  a  court-martial  would 
inquire  into  the  merits  of  the  case.  Influenced  by  this  thought, 
some  days  after  the  action  Tarleton  "required  Earl  Cornwallis's 
approbation  of  his  proceedings,  or  his  leave  to  retire  till  inquiry 
could  be  instituted  to  investigate  his  conduct."  To  this  demand 
Cornwallis  replied  in  a  letter  of  the  30th  of  January : 

You  have  forfeited  no  part  of  my  esteem  as  an  officer  by  the  unfortunate  event 
of  the  action  of  the  17th.  The  means  you  used  to  bring  the  enemy  to  action  were 
able  and  masterly,  and  must  ever  do  you  honor.  Your  disposition  was  unexcep- 
tionable; the  total  misbehavior  of  the  troops  could  alone  have  deprived  you  of 
the  glory  which  was  so  justly  your  due. 


170! 


Part  IV 


COMMENTS  AND  CONCLUSIONS 


!  T  is  difficult  to  understand  General  Morgan's 
reasons  for  accepting  battle  at  the  Cowpens, 
unless  his  personal  characteristics  for  bravery 
and  daring  and  his  superior  qualities  as  a  leader 
of  militia  explain  the  matter.  The  instructions 
which  he  received  before  leaving  Charlotte 
Town  were  that  he  was  to  act  offensively  or 
defensively,  as  his  prudence  and  discretion  might  direct,  but  that 
he  was  to  conduct  operations  with  caution  and  avoid  surprises. 
When  he  effected  his  withdrawal  from  the  Pacolet  in  the  face  of 
Tarleton's  approach  he  halted  for  the  night  of  the  15th  at  Burrs 
Mills,  on  Thicketty  Creek,  and  sent  to  Greene  the  last  letter  writ' 
ten  prior  to  the  battle.  At  this  time  he  had  no  thought  of  an  early 
encounter.  He  reported  that  Tarleton  had  crossed  the  Tiger  at 
Musgroves  Mill  with  a  force  of  1,100  or  1,200,  and  that  his  com' 
mand  was  probably  Tarleton's objective.  He  suggested  to  General 
Greene  that  his  detachment  be  recalled  and  that  General  David' 
son  and  Colonel  Pickens  be  left  with  the  militia  to  check  the  dis' 
affected  in  that  region.  He  realized  that,  due  to  his  distance  from 
the  main  Army,  Cornwallis  might  detach  a  force  against  him  so 
superior  as  to  render  it  essential  to  his  safety  to  avoid  an  engage' 
ment.  He  wrote : 

Upon  a  full  and  mature  deliberation,  I  am  confirmed  in  the  opinion  that  nothing 
can  be  effected  by  my  detachment  in  this  country  which  will  balance  the  risks  I 
will  be  subjected  to  by  remaining  here. 

General  Greene  replied  to  this  letter  on  the  19th  of  January,  at 
which  time  he  was  unaware  that  an  engagement  had  occurred,  to 
the  effect  that  it  was  of  great  importance  to  keep  a  force  in  that 

1711 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

quarter,  for  which  duty  the  militia  alone  would  not  answer.  He 
realised  that  the  movements  of  Cornwallis  and  Tarleton  had  the 
appearance  of  being  directed  against  Morgan,  and  told  him: 

I  do  not  wish  you  should  come  to  action  unless  you  have  a  manifest  superiority, 
and  a  moral  certainty  of  succeeding.  Put  nothing  to  the  hazard.  A  retreat  may  be 
disagreeable,  but  not  disgraceful.  Regard  not  the  opinions  of  the  day.  It  is  not 
our  business  to  risk  too  much.  Our  affairs  are  in  too  critical  a  situation,  and 
require  time  and  nursing  to  give  them  a  better  tone.   ■ 

Upon  his  further  withdrawal  to  the  Cowpens  on  the  16th,  where 
additional  militia  joined,  and  with  the  knowledge  that  Tarleton 
was  closely  pursuing  and  was  now  but  one  short  march  away,  Mor' 
gan  decided  that  evening  to  stand  and  fight.  The  decision  once 
made,  however  much  its  wisdom  may  be  questioned,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  about  the  enthusiasm  and  thoroughness  with  which  he 
prepared  for  the  coming  day.  A  plan  of  action  was  determined 
upon,  and  his  commanders  informed.  The  role  for  the  militia  was 
such  that  under  a  slight  baptism  of  fire,  it  was  hoped  much  of  their 
fear  would  be  dissipated,  and  that  they  would  remain  on  the  battle 
field  for  later  participation  in  the  contest.  Appeal  was  made  to 
their  loyalty,  their  manhood,  and  their  prowess  with  the  rifle.  There 
was  no  question  but  what  Washington's  dragoons,  Howard's  Con' 
tinentals,  and  Triplett's  Virginians  would  do  their  full  duty.  The 
men  were  able  to  rest  during  the  night,  and  after  the  morning  meal 
leisurely  took  up  their  designated  positions. 

Not  much  praise  can  be  given  for  the  position  selected,  except 
that  the  slope  in  front  of  Pickens  impeded,  to  some  extent  the 
advance  of  Tarleton's  weary  ranks,  and  the  hill  in  rear  offered  cover 
for  the  cavalry  reserve.  In  all  directions  the  terrain  was  open  to 
attack  from  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  Morgan  doubtless  knew 
that  the  cavalry  of  Tarleton's  legion  far  outnumbered  Washington's 
dragoons. 

What  superiority  he  believed  to  be  possessed  by  the  troops  under 
Howard  over  the  infantry  of  Tarleton  can  not  be  explained  other 
than  on  the  grounds  that  he  hoped  his  own  courage  great  enough 

172! 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEKS 

to  cause  his  men  to  do  the  seemingly  impossible.  In  planning  for 
the  militia  under  Pickens  to  hold  their  line  for  but  a  brief  time,  and 
then  retire,  it  would  be  with  the  assumption  that  the  British  would 
not  have  lost  heavily  by  the  time  they  reached  the  main  line.  On 
this  line  the  fate  of  the  day  would  be  determined,  and  Howard's 
strength  was  less  than  450  men.  Tarleton's  strength  at  this  stage 
of  the  action  would  probably  be  750  infantry,  outnumbering 
Howard  about  2  to  1. 

It  appeared  to  the  British,  when  Howard's  line  fell  back,  that 
victory  was  at  hand,  and  so  it  would  have  been,  had  the  line  been 
composed  of  men  less  inured  to  battle  than  were  the  Continentals 
of  Maryland  and  Delaware.  There  was  no  delay  or  hesitation  when 
the  order  to  halt,  face  the  enemy,  and  fire,  was  given,  and  there 
then  occurred  in  a  moment  a  scene  of  dumbfounded  surprise,  con' 
fusion,  and  panic  seldom  witnessed  in  battle.  The  outcome  resulted 
in  one  of  the  most  gloriously  unexpected  victories  of  the  Revolu' 
tionary  War.  The  heroes  of  the  Cowpens  could  worthily  stand 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  those  of  Kings  Mountain. 

Under  a  resolution  of  Congress  passed  March  9, 1781,  the  thanks 
of  the  United  States  were  given  to  Brigadier  General  Morgan,  and 
the  officers  and  men  under  his  command,  "for  their  fortitude  and 
good  conduct,  displayed  in  the  action  at  the  Cowpens."  The  resc 
lution  further  provided  that  a  gold  medal  be  presented  to  General 
Morgan,  silver  medals  to  Lieutenant  Colonels  Washington  and 
Howard,  and  a  sword  to  Colonel  Pickens. 

In  writing  to  the  President  of  Congress  on  the  17th  of  February, 
General  Washington  said: 

General  Morgan's  signal  victory  over  Colonel  Tarleton  with  the  flower  of  the 
British  Army  reflects  the  highest  honor  upon  our  arms,  and  I  hope  at  least  be 
attended  with  this  advantage,  that  it  will  check  the  offensive  operations  of  the 
enemy  until  General  Greene  shall  have  collected  a  much  more  respectable  force 
than  he  had  under  his  command  by  the  last  accounts  from  him.  I  am  apprehensive 
that  the  Southern  States  will  look  upon  this  victory  as  much  more  decisive  in  its 
consequences  than  it  really  is,  and  will  relax  in  their  exertions.  It  is  to  be  wished 
that  the  gentlemen  of  Congress  who  have  interests  in  those  States  would  remove 

1731 


THE  BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEHS 

such  ideas,  if  any  such  should  be  found  to  exisr.,  and  rather  stimulate  them  to 
redouble  their  efforts  to  crush  an  enemy,  pretty  severely  shaken  by  the  two 
successful  strokes  upon  Ferguson  and  Tarleton. 

Cornwallis  employed  the  day  following  the  battle  in  effecting  a 
junction  with  Leslie's  command  and  in  collecting  the  remains  of 
Tarleton's  corps,  and  on  the  19th  hastened  in  pursuit  of  Morgan, 
hoping  to  be  able  to  engage  him  and  recover  the  prisoners  before 
Morgan  and  Greene  could  effect  a  jundtion.  A  part  of  the  army, 
without  baggage,  made  great  exertions  to  come  up  with  Morgan, 
but  the  celerity  of  his  movements  and  the  swelling  of  numberless 
creeks  rendered  their  efforts  useless,  and  he  reached  the  Catawba 
on  the  23d  of  January. 

Cornwallis  therefore  assembled  his  army  on  the  25th  of  January 
at  Ramseur1s  mill,  on  the  South  Fork  of  the  Catawba,  and  as  the 
loss  of  his  light  troops  could  only  be  remedied  by  the  activity  of 
the  whole  corps,  he  employed  two  days  in  collecting  flour,  and  in 
destroying  superfluous  baggage  and  wagons,  and  then  resumed  the 
pursuit. 

In  writing  to  Lord  Germain  on  the  17th  of  March,  Cornwallis 
said  that — 

The  unfortunate  affair  of  the  17th  of  January  was  a  very  unexpected  and  severe 
blow;  for,  besides  reputation,  our  loss  did  not  fall  short  of  600  men.  However, 
being  thoroughly  sensible  that  defensive  measures  would  be  certain  ruin  to  the 
affairs  of  Britain  in  the  Southern  Colonies,  this  event  did  not  deter  me  from 
prosecuting  the  original  plan. 

Tarleton  in  his  narrative,  commenting  on  the  two  disasters  which 
the  British  suffered  in  South  Carolina,  said  that  the  fall  of  Ferguson 
at  Kings  Mountain  was  a  catastrophe  which  put  an  end  to  the  first 
expedition  into  North  Carolina,  and  that  the  Battle  of  the  Cow 
pens  overshadowed  the  commencement  of  the  second  expedition. 
This  comment  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  above-mentioned 
apprehension  of  General  Washington,  "that  the  Southern  States 
will  look  upon  this  victory  as  much  more  decisive  in  its  consc 
quences  than  it  really  is,"  briefly  summarises  the  result  of  the  Battle 

1741 


THE    BATTLE  OF    THE    COWPEHS 

of  the  Cowpens.  The  effect  at  the  time  was  to  hearten  greatly  the 
patriotic  cause  and  to  distress  the  British  Army  and  their  Tory 
sympathizers  beyond  measure.  It  was  the  second  link  in  the  chain 
of  events,  soon  to  be  followed  by  others,  which  finally  led  to  the 
surrender  of  Cornwallis's  army  at  Yorktown. 


I75J 


1761 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPEKS 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


SOURCE  MATERIAL  ANALYZED 

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Sparks,  1853:  Letters  to  Washington. 

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Clinton,  1783 :  Observations  by  Clinton  on  certain  parts  of  Cornwallis's  Answer. 

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Lodge,  1898:  The  Story  of  the  Revolution. 

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Garden,  1828:  Anecdotes  of  the  American  Revolution. 

James,  1821 :  Sketches  of  the  Life  of  Brigadier  General  Francis  Marion. 

McConkey,  1885:  The  Hero  of  Cowpens. 


1771 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    COWPENS 


rW  1^1869: Memoirs  of  the  War  in  the  Southern  Department  of  the  United  States  Third 

Fiske,  1891:  The  American  Revolution. 

Alman,  1781:  Remembrancer. 

Bancroft,  1874:  History  of  the  United  States. 

Dawson,  1858:  Battles  of  the  United  States  by  Sea  and  Land 

Shacomon,  1893 :  Hannah's  Cowpens,  A  Battle  Field  of  the  Revolution 

Kied,  1847:  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Joseph  Reed. 

Avery,  1909:  A  History  of  the  United  States. 

1881 :  Cowpens  Centennial 


Contour     Intervals    sn«. 
T"    inches     =     1    mile. 


Battle    of  The  Oowpens 

JANUARY    17.1781 

RoaJs      art      shown     01      at      pruent. 
Mouiel     m     bjftft      ar-i*a     ji-o     j/i»«"i     jj    o*    prtient, 
Cult'raltd      Ur.j      cj   vuooJi      orv    sA**n   «i      a/    prg,ent. 

Sktlth     mait  in      April,  t928, 
by~  Lt.Ctl.  H.L.LAnotRl,F.A.. 
Miwmiw  SctffN.AAMr  w««  Cotutc. 


;r#Jr 


—23.     (Face  p.  78.)     No.  1 


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. 


Baffle    of  The    Cow  pens. 

JANUARY  17,  1781 
Americans  —    Britf.  Gen.   Morgan. 
British  -     -    Lt.C.I.    Tarleton. 

Bat+le  Formation 
Shown    in    sketch 


4  feovdl. 

1 


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108368°— 28.      (Face  p.  78.)     No.  2 


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18°— 28.     Vict  p.  78.     No.  3 


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Monument  erected  in  1856  by  the  Washington  Light  Infantry  of  Charleston,  S.  C. 

There  is  no  other  monument  or  marker  on  the  battle  field  of  the  Cowpens. 

Howard's  line  ran  very  close  to  where  this  monument  is  located. 

The  Martin  house  in  the  background 

(April,  1928) 


Battle  ground  of  the  Cowpens.   Howard's  line  was  in  the  woods.   Tarleton  advanced  over  this 

ground  after  driving  Pickens  back.   Picture  taken  from  the  Blackwell  house. 

The  monument  is  in  the  woods  in  the  center  of  the  picture 

(April,  1928) 


Battle  ground  of  the  Cowpens.   In  the  background  are  the  woods  in  which  Howard's  line  was 

formed.  Pickens's  line  and  skirmishers  were  in  front  of  Howard's  line.  Tarleton  attacked 

over  this  ground.    The  highway  shown  passes  through  the  battle  ground. 

It  is  an  excellent  roadway.   Blackwell's  house  to  the  left 

(April,  1928) 


Thicketty  Mountain  in  the  middle  background.    Picture  taken  from  a  position  northwest  of 
Thicketty.  From  the  direction  of  Gaffney  and  Grindall  Shoals  Thicketty  appears  more 
extensive  and  is  more  of  a  landmark  than  when  viewed  from  the  northwest 
(April,  1928) 


Home  of  George  Blackwell,  on  the  battle  field  of  the  Cowpens 
(April,  1928) 


Robert  Scruggs's  house,  where  Lossing  stopped  in  1849.    A  log  cabin  of  one  room  was  con- 
structed over  one  hundred  years  ago  adjacent  to  the  chimney  shown  in  the  picture.    The 
cabin  has  since  been  weather  boarded,  and  extensions  added.  The  present  occupant 
is  Mrs.  Black  Scruggs,  widow  of  the  youngest  son  of  Robert  Scruggs 
(April,  1928) 


